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I. INTRODUCTION
Encouraging energy production using renewable resources is a widely
recognized public policy that is promoted by both the federal and state
governments in the U.S., and with recent technological advances,
renewable-electricity generation is rapidly becoming economically viable.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that electricity
production from all renewable sources will increase 72% between 2013
and 2040, with the renewable share of total U.S. electricity generation
growing from 13% to 18%.1 The future of solar power is especially bright,
with a projected growth rate of 6.8% per year between 2013 and 2040.2 If
this projection holds true, solar power will far outpace the growth of
1. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 ES-
6, ES-7 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383.pdf.
2. Id. at 16 (stating the growth rates of other renewable sources through 2040 are:
geothermal at 5.5% per year, biomass at 3.1% per year and wind at 2.4% per year).
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other renewables.3 Combined with the Investment Tax Credit (ITC)
introduced in 2006, rapid improvements in photovoltaic (PV) solar panel
efficiency and dramatic reductions in PV costs are driving a veritable
solar boom in the U.S. 4 In fact, the Solar Energy Industries Association
(SEIA) reports a 73% decrease in the cost of installing solar since the
implementation of the ITC, and anticipates an additional 20,000
Megawatts (MW) of solar generation capacity will come online in the
next two years, doubling current U.S. solar capacity.5 Likewise, the EIA
projects that solar power will account for nearly half of the total
109,000MW of renewable-generation-capacity that is expected to be
added to the U.S. electricity grid by 2040.6
A recent study conducted for First Solar, a prominent solar developer,
concluded that utility-scale solar developments could actually be half the
cost of residential-scale (i.e. rooftop) systems, when measured by the
customer-generation costs per solar Megawatt Hour ("MWh").7 In
keeping with the findings of this analysis, the SEIA reports that
approximately 26,000MW of utility-scale solar power projects are
currently under development in the U.S.' Considering utility-scale solar
developments can occupy anywhere from one to five acres per MW
constructed, a 100MW facility can cover a substantial amount of land. 9
With respect to natural resources and land that can accommodate
utility-scale solar facilities, Texas is a particularly attractive state for
development. In 2012, the Department of Energy released a study on
U.S. renewable energy technical potential, which highlighted Texas as
3. Id.
4. MARK BOLINGER & JOACHIM SEEL, UTILITY-SCALE SOLAR 2014: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF PROJECT COST, PERFORMANCE, AND PRICING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
12-13 (2015), https://emp.1bl.gov/sites/all/files/Ibnl-1000917.pdf (stating that the median installed
costs for a sample of 170 PV projects totaling 5,874 Megawatts fell 50% to $3.1/Watt between
2009 and 2014; the lowest cost projects in the sample declined in cost from $3.2/Watt in 2013 to
$2.3/Watt in 2014).
5. Solar Industry Data, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, http://www.seia.org/research-
resources/solar-industry-data.
6. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1.
7. BRUCE TSUCHIDA ET. AL., COMPARATIVE GENERATION COSTS OF UTILITY-SCALE AND
RESIDENTIAL-SCALE PV IN EXCEL ENERGY COLORADO'S SERVICE AREA 1 (2015),
http://brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/188/original/Comparative-GenerationCosts
.of UtilityScale andResidentialScalePVinXcelEnergyColorado%27sService.Area.pdf?
1436797265.
8. Utility-Scale Solar Power, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N,
http://www.seia.org/policy/power-plant-development/utility-scale-solar-power (noting that the
SEIA considers utility scale projects to include relatively small projects (e.g. 100 kilowatts),
provided the project either sells electricity to, or is owned by, a utility).
9. See GREGORY S. FRIEND, PUT IT WHERE THE SUN DOES SHINE: A COMPARISON
OF WIND AND SOLAR LEASE PROVISIONS AND IISSUES 8 (2012),
http://www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/aTab 004_.Friend-Amato-Krebs-Wetsel.pdf; see also
Sean Ong et al., Land Use Requirements for Solar Power Plants in the United States, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., at v, (2013), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl3osti/56290.pdf (reporting
values between 2 and 10 MWac per acre for utility-scale solar).
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accounting for 14% of total U.S. technical potential for utility-scale PV,
and 20% of the entire U.S. technical potential for utility-scale
concentrated solar power (CSP).10 Likewise, the Texas Solar Power
Association boasts that Texas has the largest solar resource in the U.S.,
the largest electricity demand in the U.S., and sports a growing
population and economy."1 Given these considerations, the state has an
idyllic combination of wide-open space with prime sunlight conditions,
large markets, and broad-reaching transmission capacity that makes
Texas a perfect place to build solar projects.
A number of developers are beginning to take advantage of the sunny
prospects in Texas. Recently OCI Solar Power announced it was
beginning construction on the next and largest part of a 400MW solar
development being built throughout the state for CPS Energy. 12 This part
of the project, dubbed Alamo 6, will be the largest single solar installation
built in Texas to date, consisting of 110MW located on 1,200 acres of
privately owned land.13 Interestingly, as of May 2014, Texas had only
about 200MW of solar panels installed throughout the state, including
residential panels. 14 However, during 2014, 129MW of solar capacity was
installed in Texas and $252 million was invested in solar installations
throughout the state, marking a 45% increase over the previous year."
As of November 2015, 417 solar companies are located in Texas,
employing 7,000 people throughout the value chain. 16 Though the state is
ranked tenth highest among U.S. states for solar with 387MW of installed
solar electric capacity,1 7 9,600MW of solar projects are currently under
review for grid connection in Texas, and ERCOT projects more than
10,000MW will come online by 2029.18
Though Texas is ideally situated for solar development, the vast oil and
gas resources underlying large areas of the state can complicate a
developer's decision to build a solar project. Furthermore, Texas is the
most prolific producer of wind energy in the country, and wind farms
10. ANTHONY LOPEZ ET AL., U.S. RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNICAL POTENTIALS: A GIS-
BASED ANALYSIS 8 (2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl2osti/51946.pdf.
11. Why Solar for Texas, TEx. SOLAR POWER ASS'N. (2016),
http://www.txsolarpower.org/why-solar-for-texas.
12. See OCI Solar Power Announces Construction on Texas' Largest Solar Plant, BUS. WIRE
(June 11, 2015), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150611005874/en/OCI-Solar-Power-
Announces-Construction-Texas%E2%80%99-Largest.
13. Id.
14. See Claire Foran, Jason Plautz & Patrick Reis, Why is Texas Terrible at Producing Solar
Power, NAT'L J. (May 15, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.comenergy/2014/05/15/why-is-texas-
terrible-producing-solar-power.
15. State Solar Policy: Texas, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, http://www.seia.org/state-solar-
policy/texas.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. TEX. SOLAR POWER ASS'N, supra note 11.
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occupy a considerable amount of both land and transmission capacity.
Considering the density in which solar panels are arranged within a
utility-scale solar project, any other surface uses are effectively
precluded.19 It follows that developers could face significant issues
affecting the construction or operation of a solar facility should an oil and
gas lessee assert its rights through the dominant estate doctrine or if a
neighboring wind farm is constructed that casts a shadow over the solar
facility. This paper will investigate the issues that arise in the context of
conflicting surface use on or near utility-scale solar developments. In
doing so, this paper will provide suggested methods for developers to
manage the potential risks associated with building solar farms in Texas,
the state with the most abundant energy resources in the country.
Considering the great potential for solar development in Texas, and
the potential issues such a project could face with respect to oil and gas
production or wind generation, this paper will analyze Texas solar
development in three sections. First, the paper will discuss the stages of
siting, leasing, and bringing a solar project online. This section will
include a brief examination of the feasibility studies necessary to obtain
financing for a potential project and a description of how developers can
take advantage of tax incentives through tax equity investments. Then it
will discuss aspects of solar leases and how they relate to the construction
and operation of a solar power facility. In the second section, this paper
will dive into the implications of siting a solar project, specifically with
respect to competing surface uses like oil and gas production or wind
generation. This section will explore methods by which a solar developer
can protect itself through surface waivers, accommodation agreements,
easements, and other arrangements. In this context, the second section
will also discuss a novel approach to arguing that off-lease alternative
drill sites should be acceptable alternatives under the accommodation
doctrine. Finally, the last section of this paper will identify potential legal
concerns regarding federal environmental laws. In studying these
consequential matters, the authors hope to encapsulate everything under
the sun that a solar developer could face when building a project in Texas
and to demonstrate how even those hurdles will fail to slow the "green"
gold rush in the Lone Star State.
II. STAGES OF SOLAR DEVELOPMENT
Solar developers must think through a number of issues when planning
and constructing a utility-scale solar facility. The International Finance
Corporation of the World Bank Group recently updated a useful
publication that provides a comprehensive developer's guide to utility-
19. FRIEND, supra note 9.
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scale solar projects. 20 This section, however, will outline just a few aspects
of the development process that are relevant for the purposes of this
paper. Specifically, this section will provide a brief explanation of the
meteorological studies and other analyses necessary to identify prime
locations for solar resource development. Next, it will discuss financing
structures and tax incentives available for renewable energy projects.
Finally, this section will explain the basic components of solar leases and
the siting concerns relevant to utility scale development in Texas.
A. Feasibility
Before beginning construction of a solar project, developers must find
an ideal project location. Though the amount of sunlight in a particular
area is one such consideration, developers also must investigate whether
a market exists for the generated electricity. If there is a market for the
electricity, the developer needs to confirm that transmission capacity is
available to deliver the electricity it produces to that market. In addition,
developers should conduct environmental reviews and title research to
confirm that a potential site will not reveal unexpected problems later in
the project's life.
Accordingly, the first step is to identify where the most valuable solar
resources are located. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory
website publishes various modeling and analysis research that show solar
resources across the U.S.21 These maps rely on weather satellite data
collected on daily snow cover and monthly averages of atmospheric water
vapor, trace gases, and the amount of aerosols in the atmosphere to
calculate the hourly total insolation, or radiation, falling on a ground-
based horizontal surface. 22 Once ideal locations are identified, solar
developers will need site specific data regarding the solar resource
expected over the lifetime of a solar PV power plant. This data is
necessary to entice investors and obtain financing, as well as to project
the amount of electricity that will be available for delivery under a power
purchase agreement (PPA). Typically, at least ten years of historical data
is necessary to calculate variations in solar radiation to a reasonable
degree of confidence. 23 Depending on the location, either satellite-
derived data or ground-based data can be used to project average annual
20. Utility-Scale Solar Photovoltaic Power Plants: A Project
Developer's Guide, INT'L. FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GROUP 1 (2015),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f05d3e00498e0841bb6fbbe54dl41794/IFC+Solar+Report
Web+_08+05.pdf?MOD=AJPERES ]hereinafter Project Developer's Guide].
21. Solar Maps, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/solar.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2015).
22. Solar Map Development - How the Maps Were Made, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB,
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/solar-map-development.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
23. Project Developer's Guide, supra note 20, at 42.
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electricity generation. 2 4 However, long-term historical data from ground-
based measurements may not be available, in which case short-term
ground-based resource monitoring can be used to supplement satellite
data. 25 Supplementary ground-based assessments ideally monitor solar
conditions for a minimum of twelve months, but a minimum of nine
months can improve the estimation of a long-term mean value for solar
radiation. 26
While a solar developer evaluates different locations for solar resource
potential, it must also consider whether the prospective sites have access
to a market in which the developer can sell power. Most of the Texas
power grid is managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT), which requires new electric generators of over 10MW to
complete a registration process before selling electricity through the
state's grid.27 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) also
requires a registration process for new electricity generators that will
deliver electricity to grids aside from ERCOT, but aspects of FERC's
process depend on where the project is being built.28 Both ERCOT and
FERC require an interconnection feasibility study of some kind, the
purpose of which is to determine the impact the additional electricity to
be delivered will have on the grid. Specifically, the studies analyze what,
if any, system upgrades will be necessary to interconnect the proposed
project to the grid, and what the associated cost and construction
schedule of those system upgrades will be. 2 9
The feasibility of a particular site for utility-scale solar also depends on
whether environmental or title issues exist. Section III of this paper will
provide a more detailed discussion of environmental laws that could
affect a solar project in Texas. However, even if those laws are not
applicable to a particular project site, developers should nonetheless
conduct a baseline environmental study so that a basis is available against
which any future environmental issues can be evaluated. 30 Details
regarding the necessity for title reviews will also be discussed in more
detail later in this paper.
Before a developer can obtain financing for a potential solar project,
typically the developer will need to enter into a PPA with a power
24. Id. at 44.
25. Id. at 45.
26. Id.
27. New Generation Resources - Steps to Register, ERCOT,
http://www.ercot.com/services/rq/re/newgen-steps.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
28. Abraham Ellis, Benjamin Karlson & Joseph Williams, Utility-Scale Photovoltaic
Procedures and Interconnection Requirements, SANDIA NAT'L LAB. 3 (2012),
http://energy.sandia.gov/wp-content/gallery/uploads/PVInterconnection-SAND2012-2090.pdf.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Project Developer's Guide, supra note 20, at 1, 58.
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purchasing entity, such as a municipal electric utility, electric co-op, retail
electric provider, industrial consumer, or even companies like Google or
Walmart.31 PPAs define future project revenues, which provide a
potential investor or lender with some guarantee that the project will
generate a certain amount of money from which they can earn. a return
on their investment. 32 Without a PPA, a solar facility has no assured
source of revenue, and without revenue, the project is essentially
worthless. Therefore, developers should also check the creditworthiness
of potential power purchasers to guarantee that even with a PPA, the risk
of losing its customer to bankruptcy will be low. Once a PPA is signed
and a solar developer has interested investors or lenders, it must consider
the structure of its financing arrangement and how that structure will take
advantage of available tax incentives.
B. Financing and Tax Incentives
After a solar developer obtains data from feasibility studies and selects
ideal locations for a potential project, the developer must consider how to
finance its endeavor. Obtaining traditional lender financing may be
difficult or prohibitively expensive, particularly for developers without
sizeable balance sheets and a strong history of development experience
because of the perceived risk of solar company insolvencies. 33 As a result,
utility-scale solar projects are ideally financed using a combination of
private investment and government incentive programs commonly
referred to as "tax equity" investments.34 This subsection will first explain
the most influential federal government incentive programs, and then will
briefly describe the basic structure of tax equity investments reliant upon
those programs. Then this subsection will discuss tax abatements and
policy incentives in Texas, before concluding with an explanation of the
31. See Ben Miller, Google Signs 240MW Texas PPA, WIND POWER MONTHLY (Sept. 8,
2013), http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1212303/google-signs-240mw-texas-ppa;
see also Michelle Froese, Walmart Signs PPA with Akuo Energy
USA for Texas Wind Project, WINDPOWER ENG'G & DEV. (March 18, 2015),
http://www.windpowerengineering.com/construction/projects/walmart-signs-ppa-with-akuo-
energy-usa-for-texas-wind-project/.
32. See Project Developer's Guide, supra note 20, at 1, 11.
33. See Michael Mendelsohn et al., The Impact of Financial Structure
on the Cost of Solar Energy, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 1 (2012),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl2ostil53086.pdf; see also Samantha Jacoby, Solar-Backed Securities:
Opportunities, Risks, and the Specter of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 203,
220 (2013) (pointing out a number of high-profile solar bankruptcies that raised questions about
the solvency of the solar industry in general).
34. See Jacoby, supra note 33, at 208; see also Success of the 1063 Treasury Program, SOLAR
ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/1603-treasury-program ("Tax
equity is the term used to describe the passive financing of an asset or project by large tax-paying
entities that can utilize tax incentives to offset future tax liabilities.").
48
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importance behind financing considerations as they relate to conflicting
surface uses.
i. Federal Incentives
At the federal level, the Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) were the primary government incentive
programs that drove exponential growth in the American solar industry.
Both the PTC and ITC are tax credits, meaning they are each a dollar-
for-dollar reduction in the income taxes that a person or company
claiming the credit would otherwise pay to the federal government.3 1
However, both the PTC and ITC were periodically subject to expiration,
as will be described in more detail below.
The PTC initially provided an income tax credit of 2.2 cents/kilowatt-
hour (adjusted for inflation over time) for production of electricity from
utility-scale wind turbines, geothermal, solar, hydropower, biomass, and
marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy plants.3 6 Originally created
under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, and reauthorized under various acts
since its inception, the PTC extended into 2014 before Congress allowed
it to expire.37 In the Omnibus Appropriations Bill passed at the end of
2015, the PTC for wind energy, now amounting to 2.3 cents/kilowatt-
hour, was extended through the end of 2016, after which it will decrease
by twenty percent each year until its expiration in 2020.31 Despite this
extension, however, the PTC as it applied to solar expired at the
beginning of 2006.39
The ITC is a federal tax credit based on 30% of the eligible
expenditures made by the owners of any qualifying PV or CSP system
constructed on residential or commercial properties. 40 Unlike the PTC,
the entire value of the ITC is earned when the energy property is ready
and available for its intended use (i.e. placed in service), and the credit
35. Issues and Policies: Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. AsS'N,
http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit.
36. David W. Cooney, Jr., Regulation of Specific Activities: Federal Law, 46 TEX. PRAC.,
ENV. L. § 26:15 (2015).
37. Id.
38. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, 129 Stat. 2242, div. P, tit. III § 301 (2015); see
also Cassandra Sweet, Wind, Solar Companies Get Boost from Tax Credit Extension, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wind-solar-companies-get-boost-from-tax-credit-
extension-1450311501.
39. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (d)(4) ("in the case of a facility using solar energy placed in service before
January 1, 2006").
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (a)(2) for commercial tax credit; see also 26 U.S.C. §25D (a) for
individual tax credit; see also Business Energy Investment Tax Credit, DEP'T OF ENERGY (2016)
http://energy.gov/savings/business-energy-investment-tax-credit-itc (stating that the 30% ITC
also applies to fuel cells and small wind turbines, and a 10% ITC is available for geothermal
systems, micro turbines and combined heat and power systems).
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can be carried back one year or carried forward 20 years.41 The ITC has
no maximum cap; however, it is subject to tax credit recapture if the
project's owners do not retain the property for a five-year compliance
period following the year the energy property is placed in service.42
Before the 2016 Omnibus Appropriations Bill was passed, solar projects
that were placed in service after December 31, 2016 would only have
access to a 10% tax credit.43 However, the 2016 Omnibus Bill extended
the 30% ITC for commercial solar facilities that begin construction prior
to December 31, 2019, after which it is reduced to 26% for projects that
begin construction in 2020, and 22% for projects that begin construction
in 2021.44 Commercial solar facilities that meet these deadlines must be
placed in service before January 1, 2024, otherwise they will receive only
a 10% tax credit.45
Notably, businesses that own a renewable energy project also have the
ability to claim accelerated depreciation deductions under the IRS's
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS). MACRS allows
a business to recover its investments in solar energy properties through
depreciation deductions that are based on a five-year, 20% double
declining balance method.46 As compared to the typical straight-line
method used for other capital investments in property, MACRS allows a
business to take advantage of the time value of money by recovering the
project's tax basis over a much shorter period than would otherwise be
available. An additional 100% bonus depreciation was also available for
qualifying capital equipment placed in service by December 31, 2011. In
2013, Congress extended bonus depreciation, but only at 50%, thereby
allowing a business to elect to depreciate 50% of the project's basis in the
first year of service, while the remaining 50% would be depreciated
under the MACRS schedule. 47 This reduced bonus depreciation was
originally available only for projects placed in service before December
31, 2014, but the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015
extended the 50% deprecation bonus through December 31, 2017, after
which it will fall until it expires in 2020.48 Altogether, federal tax
incentives like the ITC/PTC, MACRS, and bonus depreciation treatment
41. Public Welfare Investments in Solar Energy Facilities Using Renewable Energy
investment Tax Credit, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 2 (2014),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-solar-
energy-invest-tax-credits-grants.pdf.
42. Id., referencing 46 U.S.C. §50.
43. Jacoby, supra note 33, at 208.
44. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, supra note 38, at §303.
45. Id.
46. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 41.
47. Depreciation of Solar Energy Property in MACRS, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N,
http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/depreciation-solar-energy-property-macts.
48. Id.
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provide an economic benefit that can represent roughly 50-60% of the
installed cost of a solar project. 49
ii. State Incentives
At the state level, Texas also provides some tax advantages and
incentive programs to encourage renewable energy developments in the
state. Texas does exempt from ad valorem taxes the increased value of
property that results from installing solar devices. Unfortunately, the
exemption applies only to systems built for on-site use.50 Therefore,
utility-scale projects designed to sell power to the grid will not qualify.
However, it is possible to obtain tax abatements from local schools,
counties, and governmental entities within each county, all of which levy
annual property taxes on projects.s" In order to grant a tax abatement,
the county must follow a procedure governed by statute, which includes
designating the project area as a reinvestment zone and holding various
public hearings. 52 School districts must follow a different, but equally
involved, process. 53 Needless to say, obtaining tax abatement agreements
can be a lengthy and time-consuming process for a developer, and
therefore necessitates significant lead-time in planning for the project. 54
Texas also has a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) that features a
renewable energy credit (REC) system. As part of the RPS, utilities are
required to either generate or purchase a certain amount of energy from
renewable sources, and if they cannot reach goals set by the Public Utility
Commission, the utility must purchase credits generated by companies
that produce renewable energy.55 Though the system is designed to create
additional "currency" for renewable energy companies, wind power
facilities are generating far more RECs than are currently needed by the
utilities. 56 As a result, unless the state legislature expands the RPS
program, additional credits generated by non-wind renewables are
devalued to the extent that they cannot be considered as part of the
financial feasibility analysis for Texas solar projects.5 1
49. Mendelsohn et al., supra note 33.
50. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.27(a) (2008 & sup. 2010).
51. ERNEST E. SMITH, RODERICK E. WETSEL, BECKY H. DIFFEN & MELISSA POWERS,
WIND LAW §§ 1.01, 5.02 (2015).
52. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.001 (West 2008); see also ERNEST E. SMITH, ET AL.,
supra note 51, at §§ 1.01, 5.03[2] (2015).
53. See id. at §§ 1.01, 5.03[3] (providing a detailed and practical approach to obtain tax
abatements from school districts).
54. See id. at §§ 1.01, 5.03 (showing detailed and practical explanation of how to obtain tax
abatement agreements).
55. See id. at §§ 1.01, 5.02[c].
56. Cooney, supra note 36.
57. Id.
512017]
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iii. Utilizing Tax Incentives - Tax Equity and Investment Structures
Tax equity investors make investments in renewable energy projects to
take advantage of these tax incentives and therefore will include the
value of the tax credits in calculating their ultimate return. These entities
utilize various financing arrangements to structure their investments in
solar projects in particular, but often they are entitled to first priority on
the tax credits generated by the project. As a result, tax equity investment
returns can be substantially affected by reductions in electricity
generation. Depending on the financing structure, tax equity investments
can lower or eliminate altogether the amount needed from traditional
debt sources to finance construction of a solar facility, thereby reducing
the overall project financing costs of a solar development." Furthermore,
most developers do not have sufficient taxable income to fully utilize the
tax credits and depreciation benefits themselves. 59 Therefore, utility-scale
solar developers may prefer to structure their financing so as to include a
single or series of tax equity investors with sufficient taxable income from
other business activities, and the expertise necessary, to take full
advantage of the federal incentives. 60
In these arrangements, typically a limited liability company or limited
partnership is formed to own the solar facility, and the tax equity investor
will purchase an interest in that entity alongside the developer. 61 In turn,
the investor is generally allocated the vast majority of tax credits,
accelerated depreciation deductions, and taxable losses generated by the
solar energy facility. 62 In "partnership flip" transactions, a common form
of utility-scale solar financing, the developer will receive the vast majority
of cash flow generated from the project until its investment is recouped,
at which point the cash disbursements will "flip" to the tax equity
investor.63 After the tax equity investor's total returns earned from tax
and cash benefits reaches a certain pre-negotiated internal rate of return,
the cash distributions will be reallocated according to a pre-designed
arrangement.M Typically, the flip point is designed to occur after the tax
benefits have been fully realized and the five-year ITC recapture period
has expired. 65 Sometimes the structure will also provide an option for the
58. See Mendelsohn et. al., supra note 33, at 21 ("[S]tructures with project-level debt...
provide cost savings over their all-equity counterparts, despite the higher equity returns of 2%,
or 200 basis points, required by tax investors when debt is introduced.").
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 41.
62. Mendelsohn et al., supra note 33, at 1, 6.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id.
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developer to buy-out the tax equity investor's interest after the flip point
is reached.66
Though some projects are financed entirely through tax equity
investments, others will also incorporate debt at the project level.
However, debt is generally only available to very large projects or to a
portfolio of projects, due to debt lenders' preference to engage in projects
larger than $25 million.67 Furthermore, it is difficult to negotiate debt-
leverage arrangements when tax equity investors are involved, because
the owners of the project may have to forfeit the tax incentives if a lender
places a first lien on the project in the event of default or bankruptcy. 68
Following the 2008 financial crisis, tax equity funding available for
renewable energy projects dropped from a high of $6.1 billion to $1.2
billion in 2009.69 In response, Congress created a treasury grant program
to help finance renewable energy. In lieu of taking the ITC, the 1603
Treasury Program allowed commercial solar property owners to receive
direct cash grants from the federal government equal to 30 percent of
eligible project costs for a solar development.70 This arrangement allowed
taxpayers, particularly small businesses, to maximize their return on the
value of existing tax incentives by allowing them to receive the grant
regardless of their income tax liability.71 In other words, because most
developers would not have enough taxable income to take full advantage
of the ITC or PTC, the 1603 Program simply granted, in cash to the
developer, the same amount that would otherwise be earned under the
ITC. As a result, solar developers were able to continue building projects
despite the dearth of available investor equity. However, applicants for
the program are only eligible if they commenced construction on projects
by December 31, 2011, and complete construction by December 31,
2016.72 A variety of other investment tools are also available for
renewable energy projects on both private and federal lands through the
Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Interior, and Defense, and include
grants, loans, and loan guarantees.73
iv. Practical Notes
When considering how to finance a solar development, either through
tax incentives, tax equity investments, debt, or some combination of the
three, it is important to recognize that some government incentives are
66. Id.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
69. Jacoby, supra note 33, at 211.
70. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 34.
71. Jacoby, supra note 33.
72. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 34.
73. See Cooney, supra note 36.
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subject to expiration. As a result, significant changes to the construction
timeline of a project may be necessary in order to qualify for a particular
incentive program. If unexpected delays occur during construction, such
as a lawsuit brought by a mineral owner or lessee for example, the project
could fail to qualify for the ITC requirement that the project be placed in
service by January 1, 2024.
Furthermore, other financing mechanisms, like payment schedules on
debt or in partnership flips, are directly tied to energy production. As
described in the previous subsection, project developers will account for
weather variations and potential cloud cover in a capacity factor that
estimates the power that will be generated by a solar PV array during any
given year. 7 4 However, light blockages that arise after the panels are
constructed can be disastrous for a project. Current PV technology and
the price-competitive solar market drive developers to wire panels along
a single circuit in order to save money.75 Similar to Christmas lights,
where an entire string of bulbs will cease to function if one bulb goes out,
this means that the efficiency of a panel is decreased exponentially if even
a small portion is blocked by a shadow. 76 In fact, "[s]ometimes as little as
four percent or less of shading, such as a tree shadow across a portion of a
panel, can take all of the panels in an array out of production
completely." 77
Considering developers and their financing partners will specifically
model for a certain expected electricity yield over the course of a
project's lifetime, shadows or other interruptions that reduce electricity
generation can significantly affect an investor's return. Even more
calamitous is the possibility that an interruption might reduce cash flows
to the extent that a debt-leveraged project could default on its loan
payments. Such an event might trigger the lender to place a lien on the
project, which would result in a tax equity investor losing its tax incentive
benefits. Thus, it is extremely important for developers to adequately
protect not only the integrity of the surface in a project leasehold, but
also neighboring properties where oil and gas lessees or other surface
occupants could build tall structures that cast shadows on the PV array.
C. Siting and Leasing
Solar is considerably more unique, in terms of land usage, than is oil
and gas development or wind-energy development. For example, wind
development requires considerable acreage (20,000 to 100,000 or more
74. See K.K. DuVivier, Symposium: Solar Skyspace B, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 389, 392
(2014).
75. Id. at 393.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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acres), but after construction, the actual surface footprint is considerably
smaller, with the unused acreage often being released back to the
landowner via a retained acreage clause in the wind lease. Solar on the
other hand, while smaller in size (1,000 to 6,000 acres), in fact has a much
larger surface footprint. Generally speaking, one megawatt of solar
requires between one to five acres of land. Therefore, the result of solar
development, unlike wind-energy, is that the entire (or at least a
substantial portion of the) leased acreage will be covered with panels and
supporting infrastructure, effectively precluding all other surface uses.
Picture that: 6,000 contiguous acres, rendered completely unusable for
any other purpose because the surface has now been completely covered
with solar panels and supporting infrastructure -a sizable footprint
indeed. Therefore, as the preceding implies and as the section on
competing surface uses will illustrate, it is critical that prospective
developers complete a proper title search and review.
Obviously, to satisfy lenders, marketable title of the surface estate will
need to be obtained. This is true in not only Texas, but everywhere.
However, that is not of concern for this paper. What is of concern is
establishing ownership of the mineral estate and, to a somewhat lesser
extent, the wind estate.
In Texas, the mineral estate, and specifically the oil and gas minerals
within that estate, is king. Courts imply a number of rights to which
owners of Texas mineral estates are entitled. As a result, if those rights
are not accounted for by a developer, a mineral owner or its lessee could
conceivably sue to enjoin construction and/or operation of the project,
hence the importance of a proper title review of the mineral (and wind)
estate.
Although this step is generally taken after the land has been leased, it
would behoove prospective developers to hire a landman or a title
attorney to, at a minimum, perform a preliminary review of the mineral
estate title. In fact, a lease is not required during title research, as title
records can be freely searched in the County Clerk's office in the county
where the land is located. The benefit to this approach is simple: it saves
time and expense by allowing developers to determine the viability of the
land for solar prior to taking a lease. For example, if this preliminary
review shows that the mineral estate is highly fractionalized or subject to
an existing oil and gas lease, developers who decide that the rewards do
not outweigh the burdens can walk away with the only thing lost being
the fee for having the review performed. Conversely, if the review is not
performed until after the land has been leased, developers will either: (1)
have to take additional steps, or (2) walk away-both costing
substantially more than simply conducting the preliminary review in the
first place.
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However, if there is concern that a competing developer may lease the
land, an exclusive option agreement could be obtained, thereby ensuring
that the land is not leased while also allowing developers time to
determine the viability of the land in light of the inherent conflicts with
oil and gas exploration and development. While this is an added expense,
it is still preferable to blindly leasing land. One method to consider is an
exclusive option agreement to conduct studies and title research, as well
as the exclusive right to negotiate a solar lease. A second method, which
has proven successful for some wind companies, is to negotiate a lease
that contains an option agreement, but also expressly states that the lease
will not become effective unless the developer elects to exercise the
option.
i. The Solar Lease
If the results of the title review (and, of course, the feasibility studies)
indicate that the land is viable for solar, then developers need to consider
the actual solar lease. In that regard, developers should consider the
landowner with whom they are dealing and his or her concerns. The
following is not meant to be an exhaustive review of standard lease
clauses. Instead, it merely highlights those most critical to successfully
siting in Texas.
1. Duration
Simplifying, a solar lease can be divided into two terms: initial and
extended.7 8 This is similar to the primary and secondary term seen in
most modem oil and gas leases, and the development and operations
term of modern wind leases. In that regard, typically the initial term will
begin on the effective date of the solar lease and will continue until the
earlier of the following to occur: (1) expiration of the initial term period,
or (2) the generation commencement date, i.e., the date on which the
facility begins generating commercial quantities of electricity. During this
initial term, developers will complete any remaining due diligence studies
and other incidentals, and then will begin actual construction of the solar
farm. On the other hand, the extended term will typically become
effective automatically upon the generation commencement date, and
will continue for the duration of the lease (thirty to fifty years). It is
during the extended term that solar energy is actually produced.
Similar to a typical wind lease, setting the length of a solar lease's
initial term will depend in large part on the order in which the feasibility
78. Although the authors have seen other language used to describe the initial and extended
terms (e.g., feasibility or development for the initial term, and operations for the extended term),
for the purposes of this paper, they will not be used.
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studies and the title review are conducted. If, for example, a lease is taken
prior to these studies being performed or the title review being
conducted, then quite naturally the length of the initial term will need to
be considerably longer (5 to 7 years) than the length of the initial term in
a lease taken, for example, pursuant to an option agreement (18 months
to 3 years). It may be helpful to view the former as being conceptually
equivalent to the standard development term in wind leases, and the
latter as conceptually equivalent to the construction term seen in some
wind leases.79 Put another way, if the developer obtains an option
agreement, then the initial term should be shorter because much of the
preliminary work (e.g., environmental studies, title work) will be
completed during that option period, and developers will need less time
to bring the project online. On the other hand, if an option is not
obtained, then the initial term will need to be longer to allow for the
preliminary work to be performed prior to beginning construction and
bringing the project online. In any event, the length of the term should be
sufficiently long enough to allow developers adequate time to bring the
project online, but no so long as to raise the ire of the landowner.
Basic logic suggests that landowners will resist lengthy initial terms.
First, the landowner's use of his or her land is significantly restricted for
the duration of the lease. Second, and more importantly, the landowner's
monetary return is significantly lower during the initial term compared to
the extended term (i.e., a flat per-acre fee versus a percentage of gross
revenue). In that regard, should developers choose not to obtain an
option agreement, which would allow for a shorter initial term,
developers should consider providing for the extension of the initial term.
Doing so will not only help ease concerns by the landowner regarding the
length of the initial term, but it will also protect developers from
accidental termination of the lease before the extended term becomes
active, for example by construction delays. Therefore, the lease could
provide for a relatively short initial term, but also allow the initial term to
be extended by negotiating for several short extensions (e.g., three
consecutive one-year terms) upon payment of an increased initial-term
fee. The result is an end-run around the landowner's concern regarding
the length of the term, and if the extensions are not needed, so much the
better. Although the reasoning is slightly different, this same approach
79. For sake of explanation, all wind leases will have a development term, which allows the
developer to ascertain the viability of the land for wind and to construct the actual wind farm;
however, some wind leases will provide for a shorter development term (e.g., 3 years) and
provide for a separate construction term (18 to 24 months) during which time the
wind farm is built. See generally GREGORY S. FRIEND, RENEWABLE ENERGY LEASES
FOR THE TRANSACTIONAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER (2011), http://www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-
papers/Friend LIll paper.pdf.
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can be used for negotiating and setting the length of the extended term as
well.
2. Rights
It is critical that the lease properly addresses the rights of both parties
to the lease. Doing so avoids conflicts. In that regard, language should be
inserted into the lease making it expressly clear that the company is
leasing the property for the sole purpose of generating solar power, and
by accomplishing this purpose, the company shall have the exclusive right
to generate solar power, as well as the right to make use of so much of the
property as is necessary.80 This will include, among other things,
provisions for the use of roads owned by the landowner, as well as
provisions allowing the company to obtain any additional easements on
land owned by the landowner that is adjacent to the project. Moreover,
the lease should address the construction or installation of any
substations, operations and maintenance facilities, laydown yards,
additional roads, and transmission lines, whether they will be built or not.
Finally, water rights should be addressed, especially if the company is
considering concentrated solar power.81
Although the reality may be that after construction the surface is
rendered unusable for most other purposes, this is Texas, and landowners
will want to ensure that they can continue to use their property. In that
regard, developers should consider adding language to the lease stating
that the landowner may continue to use his or her property in any
manner that does not materially conflict with the use of the property for
solar energy production. This will be especially important for
exceptionally large tracts. In accomplishing this, developers should
consider the impact that continued use of the surface by the landowner
may have on the solar facility. Therefore, some form of noninterference
or non-obstruct clause should be included establishing height restrictions
on what a landowner can build, and buffer zones that prohibit certain
activities within a specified radius of any solar panel. Doing so will help
avoid shadows, which, as noted above, can drastically affect the efficiency
and production of the panels.82 Moreover, the lease should address
damage to any of the landowner's crops, as well as damage to any fences
or gates belonging to the landowner. Naturally, the company will need to
compensate the landowner for any such damage.
80. For example: "Tenant shall use the Property for solar energy purposes and Tenant shall
have the exclusive right to use the Property for solar energy purposes and for the transmission of
electrical energy generated, at least in part, by the Solar Panels located on the Property."
81. See FRIEND, supra note 79.
82. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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Though it may surprise our friends from the northern states or from
overseas, hunting should also be addressed in the solar lease. Unlike wind
or oil and gas operations, where hunting can continue in a limited manner
after construction, solar developers should give considerable thought to
completely prohibiting hunting on the property for the duration of the
lease (or at least severely restricting it, e.g., only through the use of bow
and arrow). Naturally, hunting during the construction of the solar facility
presents considerable risks, such as injury to company personnel or their
equipment. However, after construction there remains the risk that the
panels will be damaged by stray bullets or pellets. This is especially true
with bird hunting, where the hunter shoots a spray of pellets at high
velocity in an upward trajectory. The pellets that did not find their mark
will eventually land somewhere, and companies will want to ensure that
the "somewhere" is not on their panels. This can become problematic if
the landowner routinely leases the land for hunting, which is often a
considerable source of revenue for Texas landowners.
Finally, the lease must address oil and gas exploration and
development, as well as wind energy development, both of which present
substantial risks to the long-term success of a solar farm. As the following
section will illustrate, the ultimate goal of a solar developer should be to
preclude the land from being leased for oil and gas exploration and
production, or for wind energy generation.
III. WHERE TO SITE AND THE IMPLICATIONS
A. Competing Surface Use
From the gushers at Spindletop to the turbines of West Texas, energy
development has thrived in Texas for well over a century. With renewed
interest in solar energy, Texas is poised to lead the next boom."
However, given the state's rich history in oil and gas development, as well
as the recent influx of wind energy, solar developers need to be aware of
potential conflicts with their energy brethren in the oil and wind
industries.
i. Oil & Gas Development
As a general proposition, the oil and gas minerals beneath a particular
tract of land are owned by the owner of that tract of land. 84 Perhaps
surprising to those unfamiliar with oil and gas law, particularly Texas oil
and gas law, the oil and gas minerals are treated as full interests in
83. See TEXAS SOLAR POWER, supra note 11 (noting that there is over 9,600 MW of solar
currently under review by ERCOT).
84. See generally ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, 1 TEXAS LAW OF OIL
AND GAS § 2.1 (A) (2014) [hereinafter TEXAS OIL & GAS].
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realty.85 As a result, and of utmost importance to solar developers, a
landowner may convey or reserve (i.e., sever) the oil and gas minerals
beneath its tract, which creates a separate fee simple estate (the mineral
estate) of equal dignity and with the same basic rights of use and
disposition as any other fee simple estate.8 6 This dynamic creates a three-
tiered hierarchy to siting solar in Texas: Unsevered and Unleased
Minerals; Severed but Unleased Minerals; and Leased Minerals.
1. Unsevered (and Unleased) Minerals
All things being equal, the ideal location for a solar project is on land
where the minerals have not been severed. On those kinds of properties,
also referred to as an intact surface estate, the owner of the' surface owns
and controls all the minerals beneath his or her land. Admittedly, after a
hundred-plus years of oil and gas development, such land is becoming
increasingly rare. But that aside, siting a project on land with unsevered
minerals allows developers to more easily protect their investment from
future oil and gas disturbance. That is to say that the rights of third
parties who may own an interest in severed minerals do not have to be
accounted for, and as a result, provisions can (and should) be inserted in
the solar lease to prohibit the landowner from executing an oil and gas
lease. If that is not possible, the developer should, at the very least,
include provisions that severely restrict oil and gas development.
However, once the minerals are severed (or leased), this becomes
exponentially more difficult.
2. Severed (but Unleased) Minerals
Once a landowner severs his or her minerals (or if a landowner
purchases a "surface only" tract of land),87 that landowner no longer has
the power to deal with the mineral estate.88 That power becomes vested
in the owner(s) of the mineral estate. Moreover, as stated above, once
severed, the mineral estate has the same basic rights of use as does the
surface estate. However, for those rights to be enjoyed, the owner(s) of
the mineral estate must have access to the surface. Accordingly, Texas
courts have adopted what has come to be known as the dominant estate
doctrine, which gives the mineral estate an implied easement to the
surface, and allows the owner(s) of the mineral estate, or its lessee, to
85. See generally Tex. Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915).
86. See generally TEXAS OIL & GAS, supra note 84.
87. For the purposes of this discussion, a complete severance will be assumed. If the severing
landowner retained a fractional interest, then the landowner naturally has the power to deal with
that interest. So too if a subsequent purchaser received a fractional share of the mineral estate.
Regardless of this, however, the landowner's power to deal with and control mineral
development is severely restricted.
88. See generally TEXAS OIL & GAS, supra note 84.
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make use of so much of the surface (and the superjacent airspace) as is
reasonably necessary to develop the minerals within the respective
mineral estate.89 This can be especially problematic for solar
development, seeing as the best locations for solar development in Texas
also tend to overlie oil and gas reserves (because of course, as the
stereotype goes, every Texan has an oil well in their backyard).
At the risk of belaboring the point, solar development, for all intents
and purposes, precludes the surface from being used for any other
purpose. 90 As a result, the mineral estate is effectively robbed of its
implied easement to access the surface to explore for and develop the
minerals. Therefore, a solar developer will need to enter into an
agreement with the owner of the mineral estate that waives the mineral
owner's right to use the surface. What should be included in these
agreements, as well as their effectiveness, will be discussed in a later
section. Although this may seem academic, as the vast majority of
mineral owners do not have the resources to independently develop the
mineral estate, and it is extremely unlikely that an oil company would
take a lease on land with an existing solar farm, the reality is that lenders
will almost certainly require surface waivers from the mineral owners.
Compounding the issue further, the mineral estate itself is capable of
being severed, which has led to many mineral estates becoming highly
fractionalized with numerous mineral owners, all from whom a waiver of
surface rights will be needed. However, what incentive does a mineral
owner have to waive his or her rights? If the mineral owner does not also
own an interest in the surface estate, such that he or she would benefit
from a solar lease, the answer is none.
Obviously, obtaining these agreements will not be cheap, and a
developer should not assume that a mineral owner would waive his or her
rights without compensation. Accordingly, developers need to consider
the history of oil and gas production in the area in which they are looking
to build. A waiver from a mineral owner in an unproven or a historically
unproductive area will be much easier to obtain than a waiver in a prolific
area. That is to say, mineral owners in prolific areas will be much more
resistant to waiving their surface rights, as they may believe that, in the
long term, they would profit more from executing an oil and gas lease. On
the other hand, owners in unproductive or unproven areas may be
relieved that they are getting anything out of their interest. In the former
circumstance, there are several options to consider.
89. See e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Texaco, Inc. v. Faris,
413 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Texas Oil & Gas,
supra note 84.
90. FRIEND, supra note 81, at 8.
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First, a developer could conduct a cost analysis to estimate what the
mineral owner would be entitled to if the minerals were to be produced,
and offer to pay that amount in exchange for the waiver. If that fails, or if
such compensation would prove prohibitively expensive, a developer
could consider granting the mineral owner an override in the solar
project.91 In the event that the mineral owner simply refuses to grant a
waiver at any price (or at an exorbitant price), provided that lenders
would sign off on it, developers could throw the proverbial Hail Mary.
They could proceed without a surface waiver, praying that they will be
protected by the accommodation doctrine (which will be discussed in
more detail below), but more likely, blind luck. Although further
discussion of the accommodation doctrine will be reserved for a later
section, in the limited scenario described above, developers would be well
advised to hire a petroleum geologist to determine the probable location
of oil and gas minerals, and then create designated drill site areas in
which mineral lessees can develop their mineral interests. Doing so would
bolster the solar developer's accommodation doctrine argument, by
placing them within the purview of Texas Genco, which held that
directional drilling is a reasonable alternative that mineral lessees can
pursue.92
As the above discussion illustrates, obtaining the requisite waivers will
prove costly and time consuming. But it also raises the question: who
needs to execute a waiver? The answer will turn in large part on the
language in the instrument creating the mineral interest.
Simplifying, a severed mineral estate has three basic forms of
ownership: a mineral-fee interest, a nonparticipating-mineral-fee interest,
91. The concept of an "override in the solar project," is derived from an oil and gas
overriding royalty. As used in oil and gas parlance, the term overriding royalty is typically used
to refer to a transaction in which a percentage or fraction of gross production is assigned to a
person other than the landowner. For example, an oil and gas lessee might assign an interest in
gross production (e.g., 1.00%) to a landman or geologist as a method of compensating them for
their services. Alternatively, an oil and gas lessee might assign all of its interest in the leasehold
and reserve an overriding royalty in gross production from the assigned acreage. While there
may be countless variations, the overarching commonality is that the overriding interest is
assigned or reserved out of the leasehold estate. As a result, the landowners share of gross
production (i.e., the lessor's royalty) is not affected. Thus, a solar developer following this
method could agree to assign a mineral owner a percentage of the developers' share of gross
production in exchange for the mineral owner's waiver of surface rights. As a practical matter,
the mineral owner will want to ensure that the waiver is only effective for the duration of the
solar lease, or in the alternative will want to include an express savings clause in the assignment
as typically an overriding royalty will not survive the lease because it is carved out of the
leasehold estate. That is to say, if the waiver survives the solar lease and the mineral owner does
not demand a savings clause, when the lease expires the waiver remains effective but the owner
will not be compensated if further leases are taken. For a general discussion of overriding
royalties, see TEXAS OIL & GAS, supra note 84 at § 2.4 (B) (3).
92. Tex. Genco v. Valence Operating Co., 187 S.W.3d 118 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet.
denied).
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and a nonparticipating royalty interest. A mineral fee interest is a
possessory fee simple interest with title to all of the minerals within the
respective mineral estate, which carries with it all of the incidents of
mineral ownership, including the right to deal with the mineral estate.93
Conversely, a nonparticipating-mineral-fee interest is a mineral-fee
interest that has been stripped of one of the incidents of mineral
ownership: the executive right (i.e., the right to deal with the mineral
estate). On the other hand, a nonparticipating royalty merely entitles its
holder to a stated fraction of the lessor's royalty or a stated fraction of
production.94 This can be seen as equivalent "to the right to receive
future rents on real property." 95 Quite obviously, because the owner of a
mineral-fee interest has a full ownership interest in the mineral estate, his
or her waiver must be obtained. The real question is whether a waiver
must be obtained from an owner of a nonparticipating interest.
Technically, the answer should be no because neither the owner of a
nonparticipating-mineral-fee interest, nor the holder of a
nonparticipating royalty, have any right to lease the mineral estate.
However, in light of a recent string of Texas Supreme Court cases,96 the
answer is less clear and it therefore may be advisable to seek a waiver in
certain circumstances. To be clear, an individual that owns a
nonparticipating interest should not sign a surface waiver. Rather, the
nonparticipating interest owner should sign something equivalent to a
recognition of their consent to the surface rights being waived. A guided
overview of the executive right and the accompanying executive duty will
help to illustrate this concept.
The executive right is one of the five basic incidents of mineral
ownership.97 In its narrowest sense, the executive right can be defined
simply as the right to execute a lease. However, it in fact encompasses
much more than that, and therefore can be defined more broadly as, "the
right to take or authorize all actions that affect the exploration and
development of the mineral estate." 98 As a result, when the mineral
93. In Texas, mineral ownership is commonly said to come with five basic rights: "(1) [Tjhe
right to develop, (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to receive bonus
payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, [and] (5) the right to receive royalty payments."
Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986).
94. Lee Jones, Jr., Non-Participating Royalty, 26 Tex. L. Rev. 569, 573 n.17 (1948) (quoting
A.W. Walker, Jr., Paper Presented to the Wichita County Bar Association (Dec. 14, 1946)
(listing eight attributes of an NPRI)).
95. Id.
96. Briefly, the executive duty is a duty that the executive owes towards the nonexecutives
(nonparticipating fee interest owners and nonparticipating royalty owners) within the respective
mineral estate. If the executive breaches this duty, he or she can be sued by the nonexecutives.
See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003); Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of State, 352 S.W.3d 379
(Tex. 2011); KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015).
97. Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118.
98. TEXAS OIL & GAS, supra note 84, at § 2.6.
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estate is burdened with both executive and nonexecutive
(nonparticipating) interests, the executive owes each nonexecutive a duty
of care to act with due regard towards the nonexecutives' interests. This is
known as the executive duty, and a breach of this duty subjects the
executive to liability. Although the scope of the executive duty has a
tortured history in Texas jurisprudence, 99 generally speaking an executive
owes his or her nonexecutives a duty of utmost good faith and fair
dealing.10 However, until recently it was unclear whether this duty could
be breached prior to executing an oil and gas lease.
In Lesley v. Veterans Land Board,101 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a residential land developer had breached his duty as the executive
by placing restrictive covenants on the land that prevented oil and gas
development. 102 Significantly for solar developers, the Court cancelled
the restrictive covenants. Four years later, the Court again addressed the
executive duty, holding that an executive owes its nonexecutives a duty of
utmost good faith and fair dealing, which prohibits the executive from
engaging in acts of self-dealing that unfairly diminish the value of the
nonexecutive interest.103 These cases tend to suggest that a nonexecutive
could possibly sue to have the surface waivers canceled. Admittedly, such
a challenge would be very fact-specific, and would most likely have to
occur during or prior to construction, as after the solar facility has been
constructed it would be extremely unlikely that an oil company would
take such a heavily encumbered lease. Nevertheless, the following
example may prove useful for developers considering whether to obtain
the nonexecutives' consent to the executive waiving the surface rights:
J and A inherit their father's ranch. They voluntarily partition the
ranch, with J taking the surface estate and the executive right, and A
taking all of the minerals. X Solar Company leases the surface from J
for solar development, and also obtains a waiver of surface rights
99. As first articulated, the executive duty was described as one of utmost good faith (or the
ordinary, prudent landowner test). Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1937). For
nearly fifty years, this remained the standard. See e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Snyder v. Evans, 169
S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, writ ref'd); Kimsey v. Fore, 593 S.W.2d 107,
111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Portwood v. Buckalew, 521 S.W.2d 904,
911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Morriss v. First Nat'l Bank of Mission, 249
S.W.2d 269, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, in the early
1980s, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Manges v. Guerra, and described the duty
as fiduciary in nature. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984). Despite describing the
duty as fiduciary in nature, cases subsequent to Manges generally have fallen far short of
imposing a true fiduciary standard, which would require the executive to subvert its interest in
favor of the nonexecutives. See e.g., HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998); In re
Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 735; and Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 490 ("We did not suggest in Andretta, HECI,
or Manges that this requirement was part of the executive's duty").
100. KCM Fin., 457 S.W.3d at 80-82.
101. 352 S.W.3d at 481.
102. Id. at 491.
103. KCM Fin., 457 S.W.3d at 80-82.
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from J. Subsequently, a new oil play is discovered, part of which
underlies the ranch. L Oil Company contacts J about leasing the
minerals, but declines to do so after learning of the impending solar
project.
These facts are conceptually analogous to the facts in Lesley. In Lesley,
a residential developer acquired 4,100 acres of land, as well as the
executive right, in the vicinity of the Barnett Shale. 10 4 Subsequently, the
developer placed restrictive covenants on the land prohibiting oil and gas
development, and then built a residential subdivision. 10s As a result, the
nonexecutives sued, claiming the land developer violated his executive
duty.1 06 Relying on a prior Texas Supreme Court opinion, 107 the
residential developer argued that he could not be liable for breaching the
executive duty because he had not exercised the executive right by
executing an oil and gas lease. 108 The Lesley court, however, expressly
rejected this argument: "[The land developer] did not simply refuse to
lease the minerals in the 4,100 acres; it exercised its executive right to
limit future leasing by imposing restrictive covenants on the
subdivision." 109 Moreover, the court held that although the developer had
placed restrictive covenants on the land to protect its investment, its
appropriate protection was the accommodation doctrine, not restrictive
covenants.110
Based on this, it is now reasonably clear that depending on the facts,
an executive can breach its duty without executing a lease. Thus, it would
appear that in the example scenario described above, the executive could
be held in breach of its duty for executing surface waivers, which may
result in the waivers being canceled. This is further strengthened by the
Bradshaw holding-an executive owes its nonexecutives a duty of utmost
good faith and fair dealing, which prohibits the executive from engaging
in acts of self-dealing that unfairly diminish the value of the nonexecutive
interest.11' In the example scenario, because J owned the surface estate,
he would benefit from solar-energy development, which would require
that he execute a surface waiver. This almost assuredly is an act of self-
dealing that unfairly diminishes the value of A's nonexecutive interest.
Consider another example:
J and A inherit their father's ranch. They sell the ranch and reserve
the minerals. J takes one-half of the minerals as well as the executive
104. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 481-82.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 490-92.
107. See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003)
108. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 490-92.
109. Id. at 491.
110. Id.
111. KCM Fin., 457 S.W.3d at 80-82.
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right, and A takes the other one-half without any executive rights. X
Solar Company gives J $250,000 for a waiver of surface rights.
The same analysis applies, and again J has likely unfairly diminished
the value of A's nonexecutive interest. Would the same apply to a mere
royalty owner? Yes, but the facts would have to be more specific. The
most probable scenario would involve the executive being offered an oil
and gas lease and declining to execute it in favor of waiving his or her
surface rights. This would essentially be equivalent to the executive
taking a shared benefit (an oil royalty) and converting it into a benefit
that only the executive would share (the money for executing the surface
waiver), which was at the heart of the Bradshaw holding. 112
Keeping this in mind, although a solar developer would not technically
be required to obtain a nonexecutive's consent, it is advisable for solar
developers to consider the risks associated with not obtaining their
consent. In that regard, if the project's proposed location were in or near
a prolific oil and gas play, obtaining any nonexecutives' consent would
further insulate developers from. future interference from oil and gas
development. Likewise, if the title review reveals only a few
nonexecutives, the better approach would be to simply obtain their
consent. In terms of mere royalty owners, however, unless there is
evidence of a proposed oil lease, a solar developer can likely safely
abstain from obtaining their consent.
3. Leased Minerals
While siting solar on unsevered or severed-but-unleased land presents
problems for development, these issues are manageable. Siting a solar
farm on land subject to an existing oil and gas lease, or on land with
active production, however, is an entirely different animal; one that
should be avoided if possible. Of particular concern to solar developers is
that a mineral lessee can enjoin surface activities by the surface owner, as
well as surface lessees, if those activities interfere with the lessee's right of
reasonable surface usage.113
Thus, just as with severed minerals, surface waivers will be required
when the minerals are leased. However, unlike severed minerals, a
112. In Bradshaw, the allegation was that the executive right mineral owner had negotiated
for an exceptionally high bonus and an artificially low royalty. Bradshaw, who merely owned a
nonparticipating royalty, was not entitled to a share of the bonus, just a share of the royalty. As a
result, Ms. Bradshaw argued that this was evidence of self-dealing, which unfairly diminished the
value of her royalty. The Texas Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 90.
113. However, as explained further in the accommodation doctrine section below, obtaining
an injunction on these grounds would be difficult, as the mineral owner would need to
demonstrate that there is no other reasonable means of obtaining production from its minerals,
and there is no other way for the mineral owner to be compensated for the damage done to the
reservoir. See infra note 125.
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prospective solar developer will not only need to obtain waivers from the
actual mineral owners, but also from the mineral lessees. If waivers are
acquired from both the owners and their lessees, the solar farm will be
insulated from all future oil and gas disturbances. Since, however, a
mineral lessee's waiver would only be effective as to that lessee, or its
successors or assigns, once the oil and gas lease terminates, so does the
surface waiver. Without an additional waiver from the mineral owner, the
solar developer would be entirely unprotected and would need to obtain
a waiver from subsequent oil and gas lessees. This can be obviated by
simply obtaining waivers from both the mineral owner and its lessee.
Doing so prevents future mineral lessees from taking a new oil and gas
lease following termination of the lease then in effect, because the
mineral owner has already waived its surface rights.
Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that a mineral lessee will simply
waive its surface rights. The more likely reality is that the mineral lessee
will require some form of accommodation. 114 In that regard,
commentators have suggested creating designated drill sites and
easement areas, located within the proposed project area, that allow the
mineral lessee the exclusive right to explore for and develop the mineral
interests.'
Although these designated drill site areas can theoretically be placed
anywhere on the tract, including along the boundaries, developers need
to consider whether the drill site is feasible from the mineral lessee's
perspective. For example, the Railroad Commission (the agency in
charge of regulating oil and gas development in Texas) enforces spacing
and density requirements on oil and gas operators that regulate how close
to lease lines an operator can drill, as well as the minimum distance
between wells. 116 Moreover, if the tract is exceptionally large, several
designated areas will need to be established in order to allow the oil and
gas operator to effectively and economically develop the minerals located
under the actual solar farm. In that regard, developers should consider
creating one or two large areas in the middle of the tract. Doing so
ensures the operator will be in compliance with any spacing and density
requirements.
Regardless of where the designated drill sites are located, the mineral
lessee will need routes of ingress and egress. If these routes are to be
shared with the solar developer as well, then all parties using the road
114. David Sewell & Brent Stahl, Mineral Issues' Impact on Solar Energy
Development in Texas and Other States, STAHL, BERNAL, & DAVIES 1, 10-11,
http://www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/Solar%20Energy%20-
%20Mineral%2OEstate%20Issues.pdf.
115. Id.
116. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.37-38 (2016).
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should enter into a road maintenance agreement. For example,
minimization of dust needs to be considered by the solar developer. If left
unchecked, the dust may coat the solar panels, thereby reducing their
efficiency and production. Likewise, language needs to be included
detailing which party is responsible for repairs to the roads. In the end,
what goes into these accommodation agreements, including the
particulars of any drill site areas, will require considerable consultation
and negotiation with the mineral lessee. But what if the mineral lessee
simply refuses to waive its rights?
In such a situation, the unfortunate reality is that the project is
probably dead in the water without the mineral lessee's acquiescence. It
is true that a developer could proceed without surface agreements,
similar to the process discussed in connection with severed minerals
above. However, whereas lenders may sign off on proceeding without
waivers with unleased. minerals, it is a near certainty that lenders would
not similarly agree to forego waivers if the land has already been leased,
and especially if there is active production. Hence, the need to avoid
siting solar on land with leased oil and gas minerals.
4. Minerals Subject to the Relinquishment Act
A final concern associated with oil and gas development involves siting
solar on land subject to the Relinquishment Act.117 From September 1,
1895, to August 21, 1931, any land sold by the State of Texas with a
mineral classification or mineral reservation reserved title in all of the
minerals beneath the land to the State of Texas."' However, for each
tract sold, the actual landowner is the primary individual responsible for
leasing the minerals. Unlike the typical landowner (or an executive rights
mineral owner), a landowner subject to the Relinquishment Act is subject
to a true fiduciary standard.119 Therefore, a landowner most likely cannot
execute a solar lease without consulting the Texas General Land Office.
Doing so would almost certainly be a conflict of interest, as the solar farm
would preclude the State of Texas's minerals from being developed.
Thus, developers considering siting on mineral classified land subject to
the Relinquishment Act should contact the Texas General Land Office to
ascertain whether a solar farm is feasible on the property, and if so, what
steps will be required.
117. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 52.171-190 (West 2016).
118. Id.
119. TEXAS OIL & GAS, supra note 84, at § 2.3.
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5. Legal Protections and Limitations - The Accommodation Doctrine
In Texas, oil and gas law is much more developed than the law
surrounding the relatively new renewable energy industries, like wind or
solar. Although confrontations between oil and gas lessees and renewable
resource developers have not yet devolved into litigation in Texas, it is
only a matter of time, as such litigation is occurring in other states. 120
However, common law doctrine tends to favor mineral lessees over
renewable energy developers, at least in theory. Arguably the most
impactful of these doctrines is the dominant mineral estate theory, and
the derivative doctrine of "reasonable use" or "due regard," otherwise
known as the accommodation doctrine.
The accommodation doctrine in its modem form was first articulated
in the case of Getty Oil v. Jones.121 In that case, the Texas Supreme Court
determined whether an oil and gas lessee would be required to utilize a
costlier alternative pump-jack design to accommodate an irrigation
system that the surface owner erected before the wells were drilled. 122 In
holding that the mineral lessee should accommodate the surface owner's
use of the surface, the Court reaffirmed the dominance of the mineral
estate, while also instituting a balancing test requiring mineral owners to
accommodate existing surface uses:
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the
established practices in the industry there are alternatives available
to the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an
alternative by the lessee. 123
Notably, the Getty Court respected the dominance of the mineral
estate by recognizing that if there is only one method of surface use by
which the mineral owner can produce its minerals, then the mineral
owner has the right to pursue that use regardless of surface damage
without compensating the surface owner.124 Numerous cases interpreting
"due regard" for the surface have since followed, both refining and, in
some cases, expanding the doctrine. Generally, the accommodation
doctrine test is thought to include three essential elements: 1) there is a
pre-existing use of the surface; 2) the mineral owner is interfering with
this use; and 3) the mineral owner has other reasonable alternatives
120. Paul Monies, Oil Company Files Suit Against Kingfisher Wind Farm, OKLAHOMAN
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5402630.
121. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
122. Id. at 620-21.
123. Id. at 622.
124. Id.
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available to conduct its operations. 125 Throughout this discussion, the
terms mineral owner and mineral lessee will be used interchangeably, as a
mineral lessee is deemed to be the effective owner of the minerals while
the lease is in effect. Likewise, the term surface owner will be used
throughout this section, but such references are intended to include any
of the surface owner's lessees, such as a solar developer.
a. Existing Surface Use is Precluded or Substantially Impaired
First, the surface owner must prove that it has an existing use of the
surface, and that its use will be precluded or substantially impaired by the
mineral lessee's proposed use.1 26 Determining exactly what constitutes an
existing use can be challenging. A pair of somewhat recent Texas
appellate cases adopted a more expansive interpretation of "existing use"
than was previously considered applicable. The court in Texas Genco v.
Valence found that, at least in certain circumstances, a presently planned,
future use of the surface for a project that was physically underway could
satisfy the existing use element. 127 In those very similar cases, Valence
sought to drill wells within the boundaries of a solid waste landfill
operated by Texas Genco. 128 One of the wells was to be drilled in a
landfill cell that Texas Genco was not using, and did not intend to use for
seven to 10 years.129 Nonetheless, the court found that evidence
supported the jury's finding that Texas Genco had an existing surface use
that would be substantially impaired.130 Regarding whether an existing
use is precluded or substantially impaired, Texas cases have held that a
showing of substantial inconvenience or added expense resulting from the
oil and gas lessee's activities is not enough to satisfy this element.'31
However, the surface owner may meet its burden by demonstrating that
the financial difficulties associated with continuing the existing use by an
alternative method is so great as to make it unreasonable. 13 2
125. Courtney R. Potter, The Accommodation Doctrine Revisited: Implications in Law and in
Policy, 46 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 88 (2014).
126. See Merriman v. XTO Energy Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013).
127. Carroll Martin, The Right of the Mineral Owner to Use of the Surface, 59-14 CAIL ANN.
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. § 14.02 (2014).
128. Tex. Genco, LP v. Valence Operating Co. 187 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006,
pet. denied) [hereinafter Texas Genco l].
129. Id. at 121.
130. See id. at 124 ("Although waste is not currently being disposed of in cell 20, cell 20 is
indisputably part of the deed-recorded and state-registered landfill. Clay has been mined from
cell 20, and topsoil is being stored there. If a well were drilled there, Genco would have to
redesign other cells and lose the use of others.").
131. See Davis v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 136 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004,
no pet.); see also Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249, 252.
132. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249 ("Rather, the surface owner has the burden to prove
that the inconvenience or financial burden of continuing the existing use by the alternative
method is so great as to make the alternative method unreasonable.").
EVERYTHING UNDER THE SUN
The Court in Merriman v. XTO recently articulated the requirement
that, in conjunction with proving the surface owner's existing surface use
will be substantially impaired, the surface owner must also show that
there is no reasonable alternative method available by which the existing
surface use can be continued. 133 This particular element is debated by
academics as a recent departure from the traditional doctrine, as it
requires the surface owner to prove that he or she does not have a
reasonable alternative, a burden previously thought to fall exclusively on
the mineral lessee regarding its proposed surface use. 13 4 However, the
Court's phrasing could also simply be a restatement of the established
principal that substantial inconvenience or added expense borne by the
surface owner does not alone demonstrate a precluded surface use.135 In
articulating the burden that a surface owner must prove that he or she has
no reasonable alternative, the Court echoed language drawn from other
opinions, and added that "the surface owner has the burden to prove that
the inconvenience or financial burden of continuing the existing use by
the alternative method is so great as to make the alternative method
unreasonable."13 6 Such references suggest that the Court intended no
substantial changes to the traditional balancing test. Regardless of
whether Merriman introduces a new element to the accommodation
doctrine, the Texas Supreme Court continued to use the same
construction in the only accommodation doctrine analysis it conducted
since initially restating the test. 137
b. Reasonable, Customary, and Industry-Accepted Alternative
Methods
Finally, assuming the surface owner proves that its existing surface use
is effectively precluded, it must show that there are reasonable,
customary, and industry-accepted alternative methods available to the
133. Id.
134. See Potter, supra note 125 at 76-77, 88-89 (arguing that Merriman departs from the
traditional three element model by requiring an analysis as to whether the surface owner had
reasonable alternatives for its surface use).
135. See Brandy R. Manning & Pat L. Weaver, Texas Supreme Court Refines Application of
the Accommodation Doctrine in Texas, BURLESON LLP ATr'YS & ADVISORS (June 26, 2013),
http://www.burlesonlip.com/?t=40&an=22700&format=xm (noting that the Merriman Court
"relied on its prior decisions in Getty Oil and Haupt, which suggests no intent to change existing
law.")(referencing Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc.
854 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993); [ hereinafter Tarrant Cnty..]; Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 621.
136. Merriman 407 S.W.3d at 249 (referencing Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 628).
137. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 800-01 (Tex. 2014) ("Under
the accommodation doctrine, a surface owner may obtain relief on a claim that the mineral
lessee failed to accommodate an existing surface use by proving that the existing use is precluded
or substantially impaired by the mineral lessee and no reasonable alternative method is available
to continue the existing use.").
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lessee that will allow the surface owner to continue its existing use.'
Given how rapidly changing technology employed by oil and gas
companies during the recent shale revolution has reshaped the way
companies extract oil, techniques like directional drilling are quickly
becoming "reasonable alternatives." In fact, Texas courts and
commentators are beginning to recognize that directional drilling is likely
an industry-accepted alternative.' 39 However, just because an alternative
method is common in the industry does not mean that the method will
also be reasonable in every situation, particularly when the cost of the
alternative effectively destroys the value of the mineral estate.14 0 As if
altering the interpretation of an existing surface use was not enough, the
Texas Genco court contemplated upending yet another generally
accepted aspect of the accommodation doctrine when it pondered in dicta
the possibility that an off-lease drill site could be a reasonable alternative.
c. An Off-Lease Reasonable Alternative?
Since Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker was decided, a mineral lessee's
reasonable alternative surface use in the accommodation doctrine context
was generally thought to be restricted to the leased premises. In that case,
the Texas Supreme Court applied the then newly-articulated
accommodation doctrine to a dispute between a surface owner that was
sourcing water from an underlying aquifer for its farming operations, and
a mineral lessee that claimed it had a leasehold right to effectively drain
the aquifer for its use in a secondary recovery water-flood project.14 ' The
Court held that even though the aquifer was part of the surface estate,
the mineral lessee could not be required to purchase water from other
sources or owners of other tracts in the area.1 42 Therefore, the mineral
lessee was permitted to use the aquifer for reasonable and necessary
purposes to facilitate production, even if doing so involved draining the
138. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d. at 249, (referencing Tarrant Cnty., 854 S.W.2d at 911-12).
139. See, e.g. Texas Genco I, 187 S.W.3d at 124 ("[S]ufficient evidence supports the jury's
finding that directional drilling is a reasonable, industry-accepted alternative."); Haupt, Inc. v.
Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One, 870 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. App. -
Waco 1994, no pet.) ("Certainly, directional drilling and platform drilling over water are
generally accepted methods of production in the oil and gas industry.") [hereinafter Haupt]; see
also Bret Wells, The Dominant Mineral Estate in the Horizontal Well Context: Time to Extend
Moser Horizontally, 53 Hous. L. REV. 193, 212 (2015) ("[D]irectional and horizontal drilling
that utilize monitoring-while-drilling and logging-while-drilling capabilities now make it possible
for the surface location to be adjusted without preventing the operator from perforating a
wellbore at the exact desired location within the formation.").
140. See Haupt, 870 S.W.2d at 354-55 (requiring an economic analysis in assessing the
reasonableness of an alternative and determining whether the difference in cost between
planned versus suggested alternative methods would effectively destroy the value of the
minerals).
141. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Tex. 1972).
142. Id.
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aquifer to the detriment or destruction of the existing surface use. In
holding as much, the Court refined the Getty Court's doctrine, "Our
holding in Getty Oil Co.... is limited to situations in which there are
reasonable alternative methods that may be employed by the lessee on
the leased premises to accomplish the purposes of the lease." 143 However,
the Texas Genco court in dicta found a possible means to distinguish the
Sun Oil holding from its own analysis of reasonable alternatives. 14 4
In the Texas Genco case, the surface owner and operator of a landfill
(Texas Genco) offered various alternative well locations for Valence (the
mineral lessee) to drill, one of which was located on an adjacent mineral
lease. 145 For that off-lease alternative drill site, Texas Genco obtained
written consent from the adjacent mineral lessee allowing Valence to drill
through the adjacent leasehold estate in order to access Valence's
minerals under Texas Genco's landfill. 146 Though the court acknowledged
Valence's complaint that allowing an off-lease accommodation would be
a questionable extension of the doctrine, the court quickly dismissed the
issue because it found sufficient evidence that Texas Genco also
suggested several on-lease alternative locations that would not interfere
with the landfill. 147 However, in a footnote, the court referenced the on-
lease limitation expressed in Sun Oil, and added:
Sun Oil is distinguishable, however, because it did not involve
conflicting uses of the surface between the surface owner and
mineral owner; rather, it involved whether the mineral owner was
entitled to freely use subsurface water owned by the surface owner
or whether it should be required to purchase water from someone
other than the surface owner. 148
Indeed, the Sun Oil dissent was adamant in its claim that the Getty
accommodation doctrine should not be limited to alternatives involving
only the leased premises in all future cases.149 However, the Sun Oil
Court disapproved of otherwise reasonable alternatives that require the
mineral lessee to purchase a resource from off-lease sources.s0 Evidence
showed that the mineral lessee would be forced to purchase water from
off-lease sources if it was not allowed to produce water from the
143. Id. at 812 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
144. See Valence Operating Co. v. Tex. Genco, LP, 255 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Tex. App.-Waco
2008, no pet.) [hereinafter Texas Genco II].
145. Id. at 216.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 217.
148. Id. at 217 n.7; cf Owen L. Anderson, Geophysical "Trespass" Revisited, 5 TEx.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 182 n.200 (1999) ("Under the Texas accommodation doctrine, for an
alternative to be reasonable, it must be available on the land in question.") (emphasis added).
149. Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 820-21.
150. See id at 812.
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overlying surface estate, and the Court felt such a holding would subvert
the dominant mineral estate." 1 However, the Sun Oil holding does not
necessarily address whether an off-lease drilling site could be considered
a reasonable alternative for the purposes of the accommodation doctrine,
particularly in the context of a horizontal well that produces from more
than one separate tract. Following the advent of efficient horizontal
drilling techniques, several shifts recently occurred in Texas's
longstanding oil and gas common law.1 52 These revisions could form the
basis for a potentially successful argument that an off-lease drill site can
be a reasonable alternative for a proposed horizontal well in an
accommodation doctrine case.
Mineral leases typically grant a lessee the right to produce minerals
from a specified location or tract. The purpose of the dominant estate
doctrine, as discussed above, is to grant a mineral owner or its lessee the
implied right of ingress and egress over the surface in order to access
those minerals.'5 3 However, because any particular mineral severance or
lease is restricted to specified boundaries, the owner of a mineral tract
"has the right to go upon the surface of that land ... and also the
incidental rights necessary for that production and removal."1 54 In other
words, a mineral owner's implied rights to use the surface exist to the
extent that the mineral owner's surface use is reasonably necessary for
the purposes of obtaining production from that tract. 55 Similarly, a
mineral lessee's implied rights also extend to the surface of pooled
tracts.1 56 This analysis fits comfortably in the vertical well context, where
the well must be drilled almost directly above a target formation, and will
be bottomed only on that leased tract. Horizontal wells, on the other
hand, complicate the application of this rule because they often utilize
one surface location to produce minerals from multiple tracts.
Horizontal wells are now drilled with lateral extensions that can reach
over two miles away or more from the drill site.157 In order to
151. Id.
152. See generally Wells, supra note 139.
153. See id. at 200 (explaining that the original common law underpinnings of the dominant
estate doctrine require that the mineral owner has access to the surface located vertically above
the desired target location in order for the development right to have any meaning).
154. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2014) (emphasis
added).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 800 ("The right of ingress and egress includes the right to ingress and egress
over the surface of any pooled acreage for the purpose of producing minerals from any part of
the pooled acreage.").
157. See, e.g., Aldo Svaldi, Colorado Oil, Gas Rule-Making Hearings
Hang Up on Giving All a Voice, DENVER POST (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_29157658/colorado-oil-gas-rule-making-hearings-hang-
up-giving ("Operators are drilling wells with longer and longer horizontal bores and prefer a
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accommodate such long laterals, horizontal wells will often cross lease
lines and produce from multiple tracts, even if they are not pooled. In
Texas, horizontal wells that cross lease lines without pooling agreements
are often referred to as allocation wells, because the mineral lessee(s)
that drills the well must "allocate" production from the well among the
various tracts along the producing segments of the lateral wellbore.158
Furthermore, it is not uncommon that only a few perforations in the
wellbore will be located on the lease on which the drill site is located, in
which case the vast majority of the well's production will be attributable
to tracts other than the tract underlying the drill site.59 It is also possible
that no production whatsoever will be attributable to the tract on which
the drill site is located, because the first take-point may be located on
another tract.160 A drill site used to support production from other tracts
in this manner would seem to be in direct contravention of the rule
limiting implied surface rights to that access necessary for production on
one particular tract. However, if drilling a horizontal well is reasonably
necessary for the lessee to produce minerals from a tract, then a drill site
on that tract would not be an excessive use of the surface of that tract,
even if the drill site is used to produce from a horizontal well that also
traverses, and obtains production from, other tracts.
Given that multiple horizontal wells producing from other tracts can
be located on a single surface site, it is not only possible, but quite likely,
that one surface owner will bear the majority of the surface use burden
associated with drilling activity, even though the wells on that drill site
will produce primarily or entirely from adjacent tracts.' In that sense,
the surface owner of a multi-well drill site might be disproportionately
burdened with a use of the surface that could primarily be for the
purposes of production on other tracts. However, because the Sun Oil
Court objected to forcing a mineral lessee to purchase a resource from
definition that doesn't lock them into certain lengths. One mile used to be the standard, but 2
miles is now more common and 3 or 4 miles may be in the future.").
158. See John McFarland, Herein of "Production Sharing Agreements" and
Allocation Wells", OIL AND GAS LAWYER BLOG, (Nov. 10, 2012)
http://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/2012/11/herein-of-production-sharing-a.html.
159. See Eric Roach, Well Completion 101 Part 2: Well Perforation, DRILLINGINFO, (Oct. 7,
2014), http://info.drillinginfo.com/well-completion-101-part-2-well-perforation/.
160. Production can only be obtained from a take point; see Manning Wolfe, Take
Points: Horizontal Drilling - What and Where is the Point?, MANNING WOLFE, (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://manningwolfe.com/take-points-horizontal-drilling-point/ ("A take point in a horizontal
well is a point along a horizontal drainhole where oil or gas can be produced from the reservoir
or defined field.").
161. Upwards of eight individual wells, reaching in different directions and bottomed at
different depths, can now be located on a single well pad. In order to support these multiple
wells concentrated on a single site, the activity, equipment and resources needed are often
significantly more intensive than what is typically required for conventional vertical drill sites.
See Wells, supra note 139, at 197.
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off-lease in order to develop its minerals, it would appear contradictory
to assume that the dominant estate doctrine nonetheless obligates a
surface owner, in support of production from other leases, to carry an
unexpectedly large burden by allowing the mineral owner to use more
surface acreage than would be used for a horizontal well drilled
completely on one tract. In other words, if it is unreasonable to force a
mineral owner to accommodate a surface owner by drilling from an off-
lease location, it should also be unreasonable to force a surface owner to
accommodate a well producing from adjacent un-pooled leases-
assuming, of course, that the horizontal well is not reasonably necessary
for the lessee to produce minerals from the tract underlying the surface
owner's land. However, if the Sun Oil holding merely applies to the
purchase of off-lease resources, as the Texas Genco court suggests, then
surface owners have ground from which to argue that the accommodation
doctrine balancing test should allow an off-lease drill site as a reasonable
alternative to a proposed allocation well.
In the alternative, a surface owner could argue that a mineral owner
must pay surface damages for a proposed allocation well. Such an
argument may give a solar developer leverage in negotiating a surface use
agreement with mineral owners, as the potential surface damages owed
could be enough to make the well uneconomic. Obligating a surface
owner to support production from other tracts through a drill site on its
property may be as objectionable as requiring a mineral lessee to
purchase water from other leases to support production on its tract.
However, no excessive use claim should lie if the drill site that supports a
horizontal well that crosses lease lines and produces from multiple tracts
uses no more surface acreage than would be used for a horizontal well
drilled completely on one tract.
d. Accommodation Doctrine Applied
For a solar developer, such a rule would be particularly useful. Assume
a mineral owner or its lessee attempts to designate a horizontal drill site
in a location that will interfere with a developer's solar facilities. The
developer could argue under the accommodation doctrine that the
disruption to its existing solar project will destroy the value of the facility.
If the project is under construction, the developer could attempt to argue
that under the Texas Genco holdings, the partially constructed solar
project is nonetheless an existing surface use because altering its
construction plans would result in the project missing contractual
deadlines, losing financing or some other substantial economic effect that
destroys the value of the project.162
162. See Tex. Genco I, 187 S.W.3d at 124.
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After proving that its existing surface use will be effectively precluded,
the solar developer would need to demonstrate that industry-accepted,
reasonable alternative methods are available for the mineral owner.
Assuming a non-interfering drill site is unavailable on the lease, which is
not unlikely given the extent to which a solar farm precludes other
surface uses, the solar developer could present an off-lease drill site as a
reasonable alternative. In doing so, the developer could show that either
an off-lease or an on-lease proposed horizontal well location will produce
from multiple un-pooled tracts. As such, interpreting the Sun Oil holding
to apply only to the purchase of off-lease resources would not be
unreasonable because the traditional interpretation would otherwise
subject the solar developer to a disproportionate burden of surface uses
that are attributable to production from other tracts. In other words, the
solar developer, as the per se surface owner under its surface lease, would
suffer the toss of its investment in the solar facility by accommodating a
drill site that produces from other leases, which is an unreasonable use of
the surface. Thus, an off-lease drill site, being the only reasonable and
balanced alternative, should be considered an appropriate
accommodation.
The accommodation doctrine was originally conceived to create
balance between a mineral owner's right to use a reasonable amount of
the surface in order to access its minerals, and the surface owner's right to
make use of the land. If the most effective use of the surface is, for
example, a utility-scale solar development, a solar developer that
contemplates and prepares alternate drilling locations should not be
castigated simply because common law surrounding oil and gas is more
developed. A utility-scale solar farm will effectively be destroyed in the
event that even small portions of the project are taken out of production
to accommodate oil and gas operations. Furthermore, with modem
drilling technology, solar developers should be allowed to argue in court
that an off-lease alternative drilling location could be acceptable even
though it is not within the leased premises.
The arguments outlined above, though nuanced in that they apply
primarily to horizontal wells, are nonetheless important to consider due
to the prevalence of horizontal versus vertical drilling in today's oil and
gas industry. Considering a large majority of wells drilled in Texas last
year were horizontal, which is the latest evidence of a dramatic trend
away from vertical drilling, common law arguments accounting for
nuances presented in the horizontal context are increasingly well-
received in court. 163 As a result, Texas courts have shown signs of their
163. Bret Wells, Allocation Wells, Unauthorized Pooling, and the Lessor's Remedies, 68
BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 5 (2016).
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willingness to rework longstanding oil and gas common law to account for
new and changing technologies. 16 Unfortunately for solar companies and
their proponents, common law is nevertheless slow to develop, so the
solar industry is left no choice but to negotiate private arrangements with
little court-backed leverage.
6. Other Limitations on Dominant Estate Implied Easements
Several cases also support the proposition that a surface owner has
greater control over horizontal well placement under implied easement
law than is afforded to surface owners under the accommodation doctrine
in the vertical context. In Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the surface owner's permission is required when
the surface of one tract is used to support oil and gas development on
adjacent tracts.165 Another very recent Texas court of appeals case
bolstered the surface owners' authority under Robinson.
In Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko, the court analyzed the extent to
which a mineral owner or its lessee may control the subsurface.'66 In that
case, Anadarko and Lightning Oil each leased minerals on adjacent
tracts.1 67 Anadarko approached the surface owner overlying Lightning's
tract, and obtained a waiver to drill from the surface through Lightning's
leasehold in order to horizontally access Anadarko's neighboring tract.'68
Lightning argued that its consent was required for Anadarko to bore
through its mineral leasehold, but the court disagreed.169 In holding that
the surface owner is the exclusive party from whom permission to drill
through the underlying minerals must be obtained, the court explained,
"[A]bsent the grant of a right to control the subterranean structures in
which the oil and gas molecules are held, the mineral estate owner does
164. Wells, supra note 139, at 196 ("These remarkable decisions signal a willingness on the
part of the Texas courts to rework longstanding oil and gas common law to ensure that justice
and sound public policy are promoted...") (referencing Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 9-17 (Tex. 2008) (refusing to apply traditional notions of trespass to
hydraulic fracturing), and Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 642, 646 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2000, pet. denied) (refusing to apply the longstanding non-apportionment rule and the
Rule of Capture in a case where a horizontal well had not been validly pooled and yet produced
from multiple tracts)).
165. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1973) ("[The surface
owner] is entitled to protection from uses thereof, without his consent, for the benefit of owners
outside of and beyond premises and terms of the [underlying mineral lease]."); cf Key
Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. 2014) (drawing a distinction
between pooled tracts versus adjacent un-pooled tracts in applying the Robinson rule prohibiting
surface use of one tract for production on adjacent tracts without the surface owner's consent).
166. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC, 480 S.W.3d 628, 638 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2015, pet. filed Jan. 29, 2016).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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not control the mass that undergirds the surface of the conveyed land."1 70
However, the court conditioned its holding on the assumption that
Anadarko would not open or bottom the wellbore on Lightning's lease
without its permission.171 As a result, surface owners have the ultimate
authority over where an adjacent mineral lessee may place an off-lease
drill site on the surface owner's land, provided the well produces
exclusively from the adjacent mineral lessee's tracts.
Read together, these cases clearly indicate that a mineral owner that
wishes to drill on one tract in order to produce solely from another tract
must obtain permission from the surface owner. However, the question
remains whether a surface owner's permission is also required for a
mineral lessee to locate a horizontal well on the surface of a tract from
which only a small minority of the well's production will be allocated. For
example, assume two tracts, A and B, are owned by different surface
owners but by the same mineral lessee. If the surface location of a well is
on Tract A, but 95% of the production will be from Tract B, does the
surface owner of Tract A have any authority over where the well may be
placed?
Another example that could be particularly concerning for solar
companies involves the potential that other tall facilities used to facilitate
oil and gas production, like frac sand silos or oil tank batteries, may cast
shadows on the solar facility. As explained earlier, even small disruptions
to PV arrays can drastically affect efficiency and productivity, which can
thereby substantially affect a project's financial returns.1 72 Provided the
sand silos or tank batteries do not service production from the underlying
tract, the above analysis concluding that the surface owner's consent is
required would likely apply considering these facilities support oil and
gas production. However, such a scenario is highly unlikely, as tank
batteries or sand silos are often used to support production on several
tracts, including the underlying tract on which they are located. As such,
the same concern outlined above applies: does the surface owner have
any authority over where to place support facilities that will be used to
facilitate production from the underlying tract as well as other tracts?
Questions like these are yet to be answered, but they do carry a benefit
for solar developers. On one hand, the developer can place some comfort
in knowing that an oil and gas developer will likely seek its permission
before it drills a horizontal well that will traverse multiple tracts, or
before it locates supporting facilities on the surface. Practically speaking,
most oil and gas companies would prefer to avoid litigating surface rights,
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See DuVivier, supra note 74, at 393.
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and would rather reach private agreement to avoid court. Provided the
solar developer includes some reference to its authority over conflicting
surface uses in its solar leases, the solar developer is effectively deemed
the surface owner with rights to negotiate the location of a proposed
horizontal drill site. The developer also gains leverage in negotiations
with mineral owners and lessees for waivers or other agreements because
it has unquestionable authority over placement of wells producing
exclusively from other tracts, and potential authority over placement of
wells that will produce in part from the underlying tract.
On the other hand, if the mineral leases underlying a solar
development are pooled, the solar developer loses essentially all benefits
and authority extended by common law over the placement of proposed
horizontal wells, with the exception of the limited rights granted under
the accommodation doctrine. In addition, even though the vast majority
of new wells drilled in Texas are horizontal, some vertical drilling still
occurs, which drastically reduces the authority a surface owner is afforded
under common law. This analysis leads to the conclusion that, whenever
possible, solar developers should attempt to reach private arrangements
in lieu of litigation.
ii. Wind Energy Development
Wind energy presents an interesting question for solar development.
Unlike oil and gas law, which has been developed by over a century's
worth of case law, wind-energy law has largely yet to be made. Indeed, as
one of the co-authors has noted, it is the proverbial wild west of Texas
jurisprudence.173 However, given the parallels to oil and gas development,
it would not be surprising for the courts to apply aspects of oil and gas
law, adjusting as the facts and circumstances dictate. 17 4 That
notwithstanding, solar developers need to be aware of potential conflicts
with wind energy.
A very significant conflict is severed wind rights. The main conflict,
however, is not that the wind rights have been severed. Rather, it is the
fact that in Texas there is no legal authority for severing wind rights.
Although several commentators have noted that it is unlikely that a
severance of wind rights would be held invalid in Texas,175 several states,
including Oklahoma and Colorado, have statutorily prohibited wind
173. JACOB R. LEDERLE, TEXAS WIND SEVERANCE: ADDRESSING THE PRACTICAL
CONSEQUENCE OF SEVERING WIND RIGHTS (2015) (on file with author).
174. See id. (discussing how oil and gas law could be adapted to address wind-energy).
175. See, e.g., Lisa Chavarria, The Severance of Wind Rights in Texas,
STAHL, BERNAL, & DAVIS, LLP 4-5 (2009) https://sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/Chavarria-
TheSeveranceof_WindRights%20(Final).pdf (advising landowners and attorneys to "sever
with caution").
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rights from being severed.176 Until this issue is settled in Texas, solar
developers should avoid building on land subject to a wind severance.
However, if it cannot be avoided, the safest approach is to treat the
severed wind estate just like a severed mineral estate, which, as discussed
above, will require the proper waiver of surface rights.
Although it is extremely unlikely that a wind company would take a
lease on land with an existing solar farm-where would they build?-
Murphy's Law suggests planning for the unexpected. In that regard, if the
wind estate has not been severed, provisions should be inserted into the
solar lease either (1) expressly prohibiting wind development, or (2)
creating buffer zones and height restrictions (or similar language aimed at
severely restricting wind development).
iii. Off-Lease Obstructions
While many, if not all, obstructions that occur on the leased acreage or
on adjacent land owned by the landowner can be mitigated by taking the
appropriate steps described above, there remains considerable risk from
obstructions that occur "off-lease," on land owned by a landowner not in
the project. Generally, these off-lease risks will come in the form of
shadows cast by infrastructure near the boundary of the solar facility.
Remember, studies indicate that, depending on the technology used,
"[slometimes as little as four percent or less of shading, such as a tree
shadow across a portion of a panel, can take all of the panels in an array
out of production completely." 17 7 Therefore, if there is oil and gas activity
or a wind farm on a neighboring tract of land, this will necessarily affect
the layout of the solar facility. To avoid these unwanted shadows,
developers should consider constructing the solar farm in such a manner
that the actual panels are, relatively speaking, located in the center of the
leased acreage with any supporting infrastructure located along lease
boundaries. However, these off-lease risks are exponentially greater if
they do not occur until after the solar farm has been built. In such
circumstances, short of taking a lease on the adjacent land, a company's
only alternative may be to argue that it has an implied easement over the
unleased property for the purpose of providing unobstructed solar access.
However, Texas courts are generally very hesitant to restrict the free use
of land through implied easements, so solar developers are best advised
to obtain express easements over adjacent land where either oil and gas
or wind facilities could cast a shadow on the solar facility.
176. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.7-103 (1) (West, 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 820.1
(2011).
177. DuVivier, supra note 74, at 393.
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iv. Considerations for Surface Waivers and Accommodation
Agreements
As the length and complexity of the foregoing attests, mineral and
wind development stands ready to slay the unwitting or unprepared solar
developer. This fact is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Wind
developers faced similar obstacles; however, by taking the appropriate
steps, conflicts with competing mineral development have been largely
nonexistent. In fact, despite these obstacles, Texas leads the nation in
wind generation.'7 8 It is too early to tell whether solar will have the same
success; but given Texas's prime solar conditions, if appropriate steps are
taken to mitigate the inherent conflicts with mineral (and wind)
development, it would not be unlikely to see Texas leading the nation in
solar power within a few short years. In that regard, prospective solar
developers should keep the following suggestions in mind when
negotiating and executing waivers of surface rights and accommodation
agreements.
1. Waivers of Surface Rights
Search the title records in the county where the land is located to see if
any of the mineral owners have previously executed a surface waiver.179 If
they have, ensure that the waivers are still effective.
Every mineral owner with executive rights and every mineral lessee
must sign a waiver; otherwise, the waiver will not effectively insulate solar
developers from future mineral development.
Although owners of a nonexecutive-mineral-fee interest are not
required to sign a surface waiver, there is precedent suggesting they
would have a cause of action against the executive mineral owner.
Therefore, prospective solar developers should consider obtaining the
nonexecutive's acknowledgement of consent to the surface waiver.
Conversely, unless there is evidence that the executive mineral owner is
signing the waiver despite an offer to lease (or similar scenarios)
developers can safely proceed without the consent of royalty owners.
After the waivers and consents are obtained, present them to the
County Clerk to be recorded.
178. Texas Wind Energy, AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASS'N (2016), http://awea.files.cms-
plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/texas.pdf.
179. David Sewell et al., Mineral Issues' Impact on Solar Energy Development in Texas and
Other States, STAHL, BERNAL, & DAVIES, at 10-11, (2011), http://www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-
papers/Solar%20Energy%20-%20Mineral%20Estate%20Issues.pdf.
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2. Accommodation Agreements & Designated Drill Site Areas
Hire a petroleum geologist to ascertain the probable locations of oil
and gas minerals. This will aid in establishing any necessary designated
drill site areas, as well as the potential for future development (if there
are already active oil and gas operations on the land).
Consider including a road maintenance agreement (or entering into a
separate agreement), detailing who is responsible for dust, dirt, and rock
control, and who is responsible for repairs to the road(s).
Ensure that all of the mineral owners and lessees sign surface waivers
for those areas of the surface where the proposed solar farm will be built.
Consider the impact that shadows from the mineral lessee's
infrastructure will have on the efficiency of the panels.
If the solar facility is located close enough to its lease lines to be
affected by shadows cast by facilities located on any adjacent lands,
obtain express easements limiting the height of any buildings or facilities
on those lands.
After an agreement has been reached (including any incidental
agreements), present the agreement for recording with the County Clerk
in the county where the land is located.
B. Environmental Considerations
A thorough environmental assessment of a project's proposed location
is critical. Often touted as the long-term solution to fossil fuels, there is a
growing misconception that solar is completely environmentally friendly.
As many commentators have been quick to point out, the negative
environmental consequences of utility-scale solar abound.180 Therefore, a
developer who fails to properly consider these consequences is not only
subjecting himself to potential liability, but also to ruin, as lenders
generally will not fund a project without a complete assessment of the
project's potential environmental impact.18 '
Unlike oil and gas, where the main concern is pollution, solar does its
damage by adversely affecting the ecosystem and the wildlife surrounding
the facility. Until this point the immense surface footprint of solar has
been referenced in relation to competing surface uses; however, its
secondary effect is the complete alteration of the surrounding
environment. In fact, it is tantamount to an ecological disaster-the
wildlife is displaced; the plant-life is extinguished; and the microclimate is
180. See, e.g., Sarah Pizzo, When Saving The Environment Hurts The Environment:
Balancing Solar Energy Development With Land And Wildlife Conservation In A Warming
Climate, 22 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 123 (2011).
181. Stephen J. Humes, Solar Energy Project Development Issues: Preliminary
Considerations, PRACTICAL LAw, http://us.practicallaw.com/7-522-8476 (last visited Nov. 11,
2016).
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destroyed. Dramatics aside, the reality is that the ecosystem is forever
altered, placing what wildlife that remains in a perilous position-adapt
to an ever-shrinking habitat or abandon historic breeding grounds in
search of a new source of subsistence. As one commentator has noted,
the net result of this disruption of the ecosystem and fragmentation of the
habitat is a serious decrease in biodiversity leaving wildlife susceptible to
extinction.182
i. Endangered Species
As should be clear from the above discussion, if the environmental
assessment reveals the presence of an endangered species in the project
area then a solar company faces considerable liability if the correct steps
are not taken.
Under the Endangered Species Act, it is unlawful for anyone to,
among other things, "take" an endangered species.'83 The Act defines
take as to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 184 In the seminal
case interpreting the Act, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a regulation
issued by the Department of the Interior further defining harm to include
actions that cause significant habitat modification or degradation, which
"actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."18 5 It is
hard to imagine another action, except for perhaps logging, that would so
clearly be subject to the ESA, under a habitat modification or
degradation theory, than solar development.
Consider: Prior to beginning construction, depending on the site's
geography, the surface will need to be "scraped" of all vegetation and
trees, and then re-contoured to produce a level building site.186 Once the
project has been constructed, the result is a considerable swath of land
almost entirely covered with panels and infrastructure.'87 The result: The
ecosystem surrounding and beneath the solar farm is completely altered
(habitat modification and degradation), and prevented from recovering. 88
Correspondingly, there is an ever-decreasing supply of food (feeding), a
182. See Pizzo, supra note 180, at 135-38.
183. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1538(a)(1)(B) and (c) (2016). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2016)
(providing the Secretary discretion to extend the take provision to threatened species).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2016) (emphasis added).
185. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995); see
generally 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
186. See Pizzo, supra note 180, at 135-36 (noting that, "many existing utility-scale facilities
have a regular program of herbicide application to keep the area under the collection devices
free of any growth that may block sunlight from reaching the mirrors").
187. FRIEND, supra note 79, at 8.
188. See Pizzo, supra note 180, at 135-38.
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loss of viable mates (breeding), a loss of adequate shelter (sheltering), and
finally extinction (actual death or injury). This is clearly a take.
Therefore, to avoid liability a solar company would need to apply for
an incidental take permit, which allows for the limited taking of
endangered species; provided that the taking is "incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 189 To obtain
such a permit, an applicant must create a habitat conservation plan,
detailing the following:
the impact which will likely result from such taking; what steps the
applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the
funding that will be available to implement such steps; what
alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the
reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and such other
measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan. 190
Developers should also be aware that Texas maintains a separate
endangered species act, which applies to species listed as endangered or
threatened within Texas, but which are not listed under the federal act. 191
If a species with a statewide designation is located within the project area,
developers should contact the Texas Parks and Wildlife Habitat
Assessment Program for guidance in obtaining any necessary permits.
ii. Migratory Birds
Although the ESA unquestionably presents the biggest environmental
obstacle for solar development, in the wake of recent reports suggesting
abnormal increases in bird fatalities around solar facilities, 192 developers
need to be aware of potential liability surrounding migratory birds. In
fact, according to a report prepared by Texas Parks and Wildlife, over
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2016).
190. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1539(a)(2) (2016).
191. See generally TEX. PARKS AND WILDLrFE CODE ch. 67 & 68 (2016).
192. See James Meier, Ivanpah Solar Project Kills 3,500 Birds, DESERT SUN (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/greenenergy/2015/04/23/ivanpah-solar-plant-bird-
deaths/26273353/ (reporting that over 3,500 bird carcasses, totaling 83 different species, were
found in the Ivanpah project-area); Ellen Knickmeyer and John Locher, Solar Plant Near
Nevada Border Scorches Birds Mid-Air, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://lasvegassun.comlnews/2014/aug/18/solar-plant-near-nevada-border-scorches-birds-mid-/
(reporting that California officials have observed birds igniting when flying over a solar plant
located in the Mojave Desert, and noting that annual bird fatalities at this facility range as high
as 28,000); David Danelski, Blythe: Toxic Ponds Uncovered At Solar Plant Where Birds Died,
PRESS ENTER. (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.pe.com/articles/birds-753040-plant-ponds.html
(reporting that over 60 birds died after landing in a solar facility's waste-water evaporation
ponds); See generally Pizzo, supra note 180, at 123, 133 and 138 (discussing how concentrated
solar power (CSP) systems work, and noting that the air above facilities employing CSP systems
can be heated to as high as 800-degrees, which allegedly causes birds to be "cooked in flight").
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half of Texas's bird population qualifies as migratory.1 93 Admittedly, a
solar company's liability is significantly less than that faced by wind
companies, where turbines are often in the glide path of many migratory
birds. However, depending on the project's location and the technology
used, a solar company could theoretically be subject to the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA")1 94 and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act ("BGEPA").195 While there may be other examples, it would appear
that any potential liability would involve something akin to an indirect
taking or killing based on a habitat modification or degradation theory,
or, if proven, a claim that solar companies, employing concentrated solar
power ("CSP") systems, are illegally taking or killing migratory birds as a
result of the birds being killed in flight due to the intense heat emitted
from these systems.1 96
1. Migratory Bird Treaty Act
From the outset, it should be noted that after the Fifth Circuit's recent
opinion in CITGO,197 solar developers looking to build in Texas are
largely insulated from MBTA liability. Simplifying the facts, CITGO was
convicted on three counts of violating the MBTA, after several birds
were found in two uncovered equalization tanks at the company's Corpus
Christi refinery.1 98 On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that for
an unlawful taking' 99 to occur there must have been a "deliberate act[]
done directly and intentionally to migratory birds," such as unlawful
hunting or trapping.200 This brings the Fifth Circuit (i.e., Texas) in line
with several cases from the Ninth 201 and Eighth Circuits, which have
likewise held that MBTA liability will not attach unless there is some
193. See Clifford E. Shackelford et. al., Migration and the Migratory Birds of
Texas: Who They Are and Where They Are Going, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE (2005),
https://tpwd.texas.gov/publications/pwdpubs/media/pwd-bk-w7000_0511.pdf.
194. 16 U.S.C. §703 (2004).
195. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1972).
196. The latter claim may prove to be more academic than anything as utility-scale solar
farms using photovoltaic technology appears to have far surpassed CSP systems as the preferred
technology, with the majority of CSP powered facilities, as of 2013, located in Arizona and
California. See Ong et. al., supra note 9, at 7 fig. 2.
197. United States. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
198. Id. at 479-81.
199. In dictum, the court also indicated that had the issue of killing been before the court it
would have likewise required a direct and deliberative act for MBTA liability to attach. See id. at
n.10.
200. Id. at 488-89.
201. There is conflicting precedent in the Ninth Circuit. For example, in 1978 the Ninth
Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant who sprayed pesticide on an alfalfa field leading to
the death of several migratory birds. See U.S. v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F.Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.
1978), affd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). However, in 1991 the same court held that the MBTA
did not apply to takings that may occur because of habitat modification or destruction. See
Seattle Audubon Soc'y. v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
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evidence of a deliberate and intentional act aimed directly at migratory
birds. 202 It should be noted, however, that several other courts-mostly in
the Second and Tenth Circuits-have taken a contrary position. 203 Thus,
with the increased attention being paid to bird fatalities (as a result of
wind turbines), and the increased circuit split created by the CITGO
decision, the issue of indirect MBTA liability seems far from settled with
a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court not unlikely. Therefore, a brief
overview of the MBTA and its potential impact on solar development
may nonetheless prove useful to developers considering the ramification
of siting solar in Texas.
Enacted to implement a treaty signed by the United States and Great
Britain (acting on behalf of Canada), in which both sides agreed to
protect migratory birds from perceived overexploitation by hunters and
poachers, the MBTA makes it unlawful to, among other things, "take,
[or] kill ... any migratory bird .. . or any part, nest, or egg thereof." 20 4
Considering the original purpose of the act-preventing the unlawful
hunting and killing of migratory birds-it seems unlikely that a solar
company would be held liable for violating the MBTA under a theory of
habitat modification or degradation. A similar theory was advanced by an
environmental organization 205 looking to halt logging activities; however,
noting that the differences between the ESA and the MBTA are "distinct
and purposeful," the Ninth Circuit categorically rejected this theory. 206 A
similar theory-that conducting logging operations during nesting season
would lead to a direct take-has likewise been rejected.2 07 Although
these theories have not been tested in the Second or Tenth Circuits-who
have been more willing to extend the scope of the MBTA-it seems
202. See e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y., 952 F.2d at 297, and Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Mahler v. U.S. Forest Service, 927 F.Supp. 1559
(S.D. Ind. 1996); United States. v. Brigham Oil and Gas, LP, 840 F.Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
203. See e.g., United States. v. Union Tex. Petroleum, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616 (D. Colo.
July 11, 1973) (finding an oil company liable under the MTBA after several birds died after
landing in a sludge pit); United States. v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F.Supp. 510 (finding Corbin
liable for spraying pesticides that resulted in the death of several migratory birds); United States.
v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding FMC liable after several birds died after
landing in a wastewater storage pond); See also United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d
679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo.
1999).
204. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (a) (2012).
205. Unlike the ESA, the MBTA does not provide for citizen suits; however, environmental
organizations have been moderately successful-as far as standing is concerned-in bringing an
action under different statutes, e.g., the ESA, and tacking on an MBTA claim. Compare Seattle
Audubon Soc'y., 952 F.2d at 303 with Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Found. v. Scottish
Power, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2772 (D. Kan. 2005), affd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19330 (10th
Cir. 2005).
206. Seattle Audubon Soc'y., 952 F.2d at 303.
207. See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. U. S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir.
1997); Mahler, 927 F. Supp. 1559.
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doubtful that it would fare much better in those courts. For starters, the
definition of take in the MBTA is fundamentally different from the
definition given to the term in the ESA (or for that matter the BGEPA).
In both the ESA and the BGEPA, take is modified by terms-harm and
disturb respectively -that allow for the imposition of liability if an
individual indirectly kills or injures a species or eagle by modifying their
habitat to such a degree that their normal behavioral, breeding, or
sheltering patterns are significantly altered. Conversely, take is defined in
the MBTA as "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect." 208 It is conceptually difficult to imagine how take or kill could be
interpreted to include a habitat modification theory of liability without
similar modifiers; in fact, the presence of those modifiers in the ESA and
the BGEPA, but their absence in the MBTA is suggestive in and of itself.
On the other hand, without the protection provided by cases such as
CITGO and Brigham Oil,209 developers considering concentrated solar
power have an increased potential for liability. And if the recent reports
prove to be true-that birds are being cooked in mid-flight-then solar
companies employing concentrated solar power would be directly within
the purview of Apollo EnergieS210 and Moon Lake,211 which held
companies strictly liable for the indirect and unintentional killing of
several migratory birds. Can liability be avoided? Unlike the Endangered
Species Act and the Bald and Golden Eagle Act, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act does not have a permitting system for incidental takes.
Therefore, if a solar company's environmental assessment indicates that
migratory birds might be affected by the prospective solar farm, then the
best approach may be to develop a site-specific Bird and Bat
Conservation Strategy, 212 which demonstrates, among other things, how
the company intends to avoid and minimize the solar farm's impact on
migratory birds.213 This same approach has been recommended by co-
author Ernest Smith as a method wind farms could use to avoid MBTA
liability.214
208. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2016).
209. Brigham Oil and Gas, LP, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
210. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 679.
211. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
212. Although the guidelines were developed with wind energy in mind, the FWS's Land-
Based Wind Energy Guidelines could easily be altered to address a solar company's potential
take.
213. See generally Interim Guidelines For the Development of a
Project Specific Avian and Bat Protection Plan for Wind Energy
Facilities, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. PAC. SW. REGION 1, 2 (2010),
https://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/TexasCoastal/docs/Interim GuidelinesAvian-andBatProte
ction_.Plan.pdf (noting that the FWS has indicated that it will consider a company's good faith
efforts to avoid taking migratory birds when deciding whether to pursue charges).
214. SMITH, supra note 51, at § 10.02.
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2. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
While solar companies are reasonably insulated from liability under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the same is not necessarily true of the
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA). Thus, if a company's
environmental assessment indicates the presence of eagles in the project's
proposed location additional steps may be required. This is true not just
in Texas, but anywhere that eagles populate.
Under the BGEPA, it is unlawful for anyone to "knowingly, or with
wanton disregard for the consequences of his act, take . .. at any time or
in any manner, any bald eagle ... or any golden eagle ... or any part,
nest, or egg thereof." 215 The act's accompanying regulations further
define "take" as to "kill . . . destroy, molest, or disturb."216 Disturb is
further defined as:
agitat[ing] or bother[ing] a bald or golden eagle to a degree that
causes, or is likely to cause ...
(1) injury to an eagle,
(2) a decrease in its productivity, by substantially interfering with
normal breeding, feeding, or sheltering behavior, or
(3) nest abandonment, by substantially interfering with normal
breeding, feeding, or sheltering behavior. 217
Perhaps due to the bald eagle's status as a national symbol, the take
provision under the BGEPA is significantly broader than it is under the
ESA (or the MBTA). Indeed, under the ESA, as previously discussed,
take includes harm or harassment that "actually kills or injures
wildlife." 218 The Eagle Act, however, merely requires a likelihood of
disturbance.
In any event, as discussed in connection with the Endangered Species
Act, the surface footprint of utility-scale solar farms can drastically alter
the surrounding environment, leading to a loss in biodiversity and
ultimately habitat fragmentation; thus, siting in known eagle locations
would almost certainly qualify as a take under the BGEPA, whether
through nest abandonment or via a decrease in productivity. However,
unless it can be shown that an eagle was actually injured or killed because
of the fragmentation, it seems unlikely that a solar company would be
penalized. That is to say, whereas the ESA provides for citizen suit to
enforce the act, the BGEPA does not provide for citizen suit; hence, an
enforcement proceeding seems rather unlikely for speculative takes.
Thus, it would appear that liability would only arise if, for example, an
215. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
216. 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2016) (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016) (emphasis added).
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environmental organization were able to challenge agency action on an
unrelated matter and tack on a BGEPA claim. A similar approach was
recently taken in Maine, where an environmental organization tried to
enforce the BGEPA against a proposed wind farm by claiming the Army
Corp of Engineers, in issuing a Section 404 permit under the Clean Water
Act, failed to adequately consider the impact on eagles. 219 Although the
court admitted that it found the argument persuasive, it noted that there
was no evidence that eagles would actually be affected by the issuance of
the 404 permit.220 This dynamic creates an incentive for solar companies
to ignore the BGEPA, so long as their operations do not actually lead to
an eagle being killed or harmed.
On the other hand, an eagle being cooked in mid-flight is a clear
violation of the BGEPA; provided, however, that the solar company
acted knowingly or with wanton disregard. It seems clear that if a
company knew a proposed location was within the territory of a gold or
bald eagle and nonetheless built a concentrated solar power facility, that,
at the very least, would constitute wanton disregard.
Fortunately, unlike the MBTA, the Eagle Act does provide a
permitting system for the incidental takings of bald and golden eagles. 221
Unfortunately, it is far from simple. To qualify for a permit, an applicant
must show:
(1) that the take is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle
and the golden eagle;
(2) that it is necessary to protect an interest in a particular locality;
(3) that it is associated with but not the purpose of the activity; and
(4) for a standard permit, that the take cannot be practicably
avoided; or for a programmatic permit, that the take is unavoidable
even though advanced conservation practices are being
implemented.222
Advanced Conservation Plans (or Eagle Conservation Plans), in
general, are site-specific plans developed by the applicant and the
Service, that at a minimum will demonstrate how the applicant will avoid,
minimize, and mitigate the take. 223
219. See Friends of the Boundary Mts. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 24 F. Supp. 3d 105 (D.
Me. 2014).
220. Id. at 119-121.
221. For an excellent discussion of the permitting process, see Brooke Wahlberg, The
Curious Problem of Eagles, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 51 (2014).
222. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a) (2016).
223. See Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interest in Particular Localities, 74 Fed.
Reg., 46, 842. (Sept. 11, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 13, 22 (2016)).
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C. Miscellaneous and Related Concerns
Aside from the environmental concerns discussed above, solar
developers, like all energy developers, need to be cognizant of other
federal environmental statutes that may be implicated depending on the
project. For example, if a solar project is to be sited in or near a wetland,
then the developer should consider its obligations under the Clean Water
Act. The same is true of state law as well. For example, if it is determined
during the assessment period that historical or cultural resources will be
impacted by the solar farm, the developer should consider its obligations,
if any, under the Texas Historical Commission 2 24 and the Antiquities
Code 2 25 as well as any other local or state laws governing historical and
cultural remains.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no bigger risk to utility-scale solar development in Texas (or
for that matter, most any other major oil and gas producing state) than
competing oil and gas development. Texas, like many other states,
adheres to the dominant estate doctrine, which gives the mineral estate
an implied easement to use so much of the surface as is reasonably
necessary to develop the minerals. As a result, if solar developers do not
take the proper steps to address oil and gas development, their solar
project is at considerable risk of project-killing litigation. Although
developers may be able to rely on the accommodation doctrine, as this
paper discussed, there is no guarantee that solar developers will be
protected. Therefore, to sufficiently insulate a project from oil and gas
production-related disruption, it is advisable for developers to complete a
preliminary title review and obtain any necessary surface waivers and
surface-use-accommodation agreements prior to committing any
significant investments in time or money. Likewise, wind-energy
development presents many of the same risks. In particular, the lack of
statutory or common law guidance in Texas regarding wind energy
creates additional risk. In the authors' opinion, until the Texas
Legislature or courts define the legal contours of wind energy, solar
developers should proceed with caution when faced with competing
wind-energy development. However, if developers are left with no other
choice, the best approach may be to treat wind like oil and gas.
Aside from the oil and gas (and wind) related issues, solar developers
also need to be aware of environmental concerns. As the discussion
above illustrated, the most likely environmental problems presented
involve endangered and threatened species, both nationally and in Texas.
224. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 442 (West 2012).
225. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 191 (West 2010).
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Nevertheless, if developers are considering using concentrated solar
power, those developers should also pay heed to any potential liability for
harm caused to migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles.
In conclusion, with the recent extension of the Investment Tax Credit,
the United States is primed for a solar-energy boom, and Texas is poised
to lead the way. In that regard, it has been the goal of this paper to
highlight potential issues that developers are likely to encounter, as well
as to suggest solutions for mitigating their impact. Taking these issues
into consideration and following the steps outlined in this paper should
aid developers in maximizing the immense solar potential found in the
Lone Star State.
